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Abstract
We propose and test a new method for eliciting curvature-controlled discount rates that are invariant
to the form of the utility function. Our method uses a single elicitation task and has the advantage of
obtaining individual discount rates without knowledge of risk attitude or parametric assumptions about
the form of the utility function. We compare our method to the Andersen et al. (2008) double elicitation
technique in which the utility function and discount rate are jointly estimated. We use a laboratory
experiment to perform a within-subjects comparison of discount rates from these two methods and find
consistent results, which is reassuring given the wide range of estimates in the literature. In addition,
the estimated discount rates in our study are “plausibly low” in contrast to the vast majority of discount
rate studies. Our results are robust to relaxing the expected utility assumption of linearity in the
probabilities, as we find little evidence of probability weighting in our data. In a second experiment, we
find that discount rates are not sensitive to the length of the horizon, but are sensitive to the length of
the front-end delay, suggesting present bias. We estimate average discount rates to be 12.2 percent in
the first experiment and 11.3 percent in the second experiment when the front-end delay is at least two
weeks.
1 Introduction
A better understanding of how people weigh future consumption against current consumption is crucial to
understanding many economic decisions. These decisions are important at both the individual level (e.g.,
how much one should invest in education, health care and savings) and the societal level (e.g., how much
to invest in environmental preservation or damage amelioration). That said, there is no clear consensus
regarding the amount by which future consumption is discounted. Reported discount rates have ranged
from negative six percent to essentially infinity in various studies.1 The disparity in observed discount rates
is not entirely surprising given the methodological differences across studies. Differences include the source of
data (field, survey, or laboratory), the type of good studied (including goods as diverse as appliances, money,
pain in the form of electric shock, or heroin), and whether the observed choices have real consequences.
∗slaury@gsu.edu
†mcinnes@moore.sc.edu
‡swarthout@gsu.edu
§erica.vonnessen@gmail.com
1See Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of the literature.
1
A recent focus of discount rate research addresses an important confound in most of the earlier literature.
Previous estimates, such as those from the widely-cited Coller and Williams (1999) study, assume prefer-
ences are linear in wealth. Linear preferences are consistent with a risk-neutral decision maker; however,
many studies provide direct evidence of widespread risk aversion, even over small monetary outcomes (e.g.,
Binswanger, 1980; Hey and Orme, 1994). If preferences are in fact concave rather than linear, the result
of estimation incorrectly assuming linearity will be a positive bias in estimated discount rates (Andersen
et al., 2008). Given that individual risk aversion increases with the size of the stakes (Holt and Laury, 2002),
the bias becomes more severe in discount rate experiments that use higher stakes. Thus a more appropri-
ate specification of discount-rate models should include a curvature-correction for such non-linearity in the
utility function.
Recent work has suggested approaches to account for the influence of risk aversion on time preferences.
Andersen et al. (2008) measure both risk and time preferences for each subject by using the procedure of
Coller and Williams (1999) to elicit discount rates and the procedure of Holt and Laury (2002) to elicit risk
attitudes. By jointly estimating both risk and time preferences, they obtain an estimated aggregate discount
rate of 10.1 percent per year, which is significantly lower than under the assumption of linear utility. However,
other recent studies that account for the curvature of the utility function in different ways (and also offer
real, monetary rewards) have found vastly different results. Takeuchi (2011) uses an alternative procedure to
estimate discount rates that is theoretically invariant to utility curvature, and estimates an average annual
discount rate of 726 percent. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) avoid the bias of linear preferences by eliciting
time preferences with convex budget sets, and estimate an aggregate discount rate of 30 percent per year.
Coble and Lusk (2010) use a joint estimation approach to estimate a Kreps-Porteus model (Kreps and
Porteus, 1978) that nests the discounted expected utility model as a special case. Given their assumption of
constant elasticity of substitution, they reject the discounted expected utility model and estimate a relatively
high discount rate of 51.3 percent. Rohde (2010) presents a theoretical framework for eliciting preferences
over outcomes with fixed payoffs but variable delays and using responses to develop the “hyperbolic factor,”
a measure of the time inconsistency of preferences that does not require specifying or estimating a utility
function.
In this paper, we propose and test a new method for eliciting discount rates that yields curvature-
controlled discount rates that are invariant to the form of the utility function. Following the suggestion
of Frederick et al. (2002, p. 382), our method applies the binary lottery payment approach first used by
Roth and Malouf (1979) in studying bilateral bargaining. We measure how much higher the probability of
winning a fixed prize must be in order to delay consumption. The advantage of this method is that individual
discount rates can be obtained without knowledge of risk attitude or parametric assumptions about the form
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of the utility function.
We compare our “curvature free” elicitation method to the Andersen et al. (2008) double elicitation
technique in which the utility function and discount rates are jointly estimated. We conduct a laboratory
experiment to perform a within-subjects comparison of discount rates from these two methods and find
consistent results, which is reassuring given the wide range of estimates in the literature. In addition, the
estimated discount rates in our study are “plausibly low,” in contrast to the vast majority of other discount
rate studies. Average discount rates are estimated to be 12.2 percent using our probability discounting
elicitation compared to 14.1 percent using joint estimation, and confidence intervals substantially overlap.
We find our participants to be risk averse on average, and failing to allow for these non-linear preferences
substantially increases the estimated discount rate to 55.5 percent. We consider sensitivity to background
consumption and find the jointly estimated discount rates increase modestly as background consumption is
increased, while the results from our method are invariant by design. We also consider how our approach is
a affected by relaxing the assumption of linearity in the probabilities, but empirically we find little evidence
of probability weighting over the range of probabilities used in our experiment.
At the individual level, we find a substantial portion of participants are willing to defer consumption when
offered a modest increase in probability of future payment, indicating a very low discount rate. We conduct
a second experiment to explore the robustness of this finding and to obtain a within-subjects measure of the
sensitivity of the discount rate to both the horizon and the front-end delay. In all treatments, we continue to
find a substantial number of very patient participants. We also find evidence in favor of present bias rather
than constant time preference.
In Section 2 below we describe an expected utility model with exponential discounting and illustrate our
strategy of eliciting time preferences by varying probabilities rather than payoffs. To compare our method
with the joint estimation method, we conduct a within-subjects experiment with real-valued payoffs using
both methods, as presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our data, report results from maximum
likelihood estimation, and present sensitivity tests. Next, in Section 5, we present a second experiment to
measure sensitivity of time preferences to the length of the front-end delay and the time horizon. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
We begin by assuming exponential discounting and an additively-separable inter-temporal utility function.
In the typical discount rate model, an individual decides between option A which yields extra income Mt at
time t and option B which yields Mt+τ at time t + τ by choosing the option with the larger present value.
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We can express these present values as
PVA =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
U (ω +Mt) +
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
U (ω) (1)
and
PVB =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
U (ω +Mt+τ ) , (2)
where ω is the time invariant amount of background consumption, δ is the discount rate, and U(·) is the
per-period expected utility function. By equating the present value expressions in Equations 1 and 2, we
create the following indifference condition
U (ω +Mt) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
U (ω) = U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
U (ω +Mt+τ ) , (3)
and can now solve for the discount rate δ. If we further assume the utility function is linear in ω (as most
discount rate studies do) this equation reduces to
Mt =
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
Mt+τ . (4)
Equation 4 has been the basis for many previous time preference studies. If, however, preferences are not
linear, then Equations 3 and 4 clearly are not the same. Any analysis incorrectly assuming linearity and
applying Equation 4 will yield upwardly-biased discount rate estimates. To better illustrate this bias, consider
a person who is indifferent between $1 now and $2 in one year. This indifference condition implies an annual
discount rate of 100 percent over monetary amounts. However, concave preferences imply a diminishing
marginal utility of money, and so the utility of $2 in one year is actually less than twice the utility of $1
now. This, in turn, results in an annual discount rate over utility values of less than 100 percent.
One solution to this upward bias of discount rate estimates is to obtain an estimate of the curvature of
the utility function and then apply it to Equation 3. An alternative solution that is the focus of this paper
is to apply the binary lottery payoff procedure first introduced by Roth and Malouf (1979) to the elicitation
of discount rates.
Continuing with Equation 3, we now hold the amount of extra income constant (Mt = Mt+τ = M) and
instead vary the probability that the payment is made. Let pt be the probability of receiving extra income
M at time t and pt+τ be the probability of receiving extra income at time t+ τ . An individual is indifferent
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between these two options if
ptU (ω +M) + (1− pt)U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
U (ω) =
U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
[pt+τU (ω +M) + (1− pt+τ )U (ω)] . (5)
Without loss of generality, we let U (ω) = 0 and U (ω +M) = 1, and Equation 5 reduces to
pt =
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
pt+τ . (6)
This expression now provides us an approach to estimate discount rates without having to parameterize
and estimate the utility function. In Section 3.1 we develop a simple elicitation procedure for individual
discount rates in a manner similar to the widely-used risk aversion elicitation procedure of Holt and Laury
(2002). Of course, this approach maintains the expected utility assumption that requires linearity in the
objective probabilities.2 Alternative assumptions about preferences, such as cumulative prospect theory,
allow for probability weighting. We address this possibility in Section 2.4 and empirically in Section 4.3. We
also consider consumption smoothing, background consumption, and non-exponential discounting.
2.1 Consumption Smoothing
When evaluating intertemporal consumption choices, it seems unduly restrictive to assume away consumption
smoothing. Individuals may prefer to spread the consumption of M over several periods. We consider
the dual-self model of impulse control proposed by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and introduced into the
context of discounting by Andersen et al. (2008). This model assumes individuals succumb to temptation for
immediate gratification when offered short-term gains but are able to plan and smooth consumption when
offered gains over a longer term. To apply the dual-self model, we assume that t is sufficiently far in the
future that the short-run impulsive “self” is not involved in the decision.3 Further, we assume that extra
income is smoothed evenly over η time periods. Given these assumptions, we rewrite Equation 5 as
pt
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U
(
ω +
M
η
)
+ (1− pt)
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)η τ−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U (ω) =
τ−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U (ω) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ [
pt+τ
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U
(
ω +
M
η
)
+ (1− pt+τ )
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U (ω)
]
. (7)
2Note that our approach does not require that Equation 6 holds for all combinations of pt and pt+τ . We can cover a broad
range of discount rates (0 to 347 percent) by varying p between 0.5 and .65, thus allowing us to avoid extreme probabilities
where probability weighting has been shown to be most severe.
3We chose our experimental implementation to satisfy this assumption: all payments are made either three or twelve weeks
in the future.
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We assign U (ω) = 0 and Equation 7 simplifies to
pt
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U
(
ω +
M
η
)
=
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
pt+τ
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U
(
ω +
M
η
)
. (8)
We next divide both sides of this expression by
η−1∑
k=0
(
1
1 + δ
)k
U
(
ω +
M
η
)
, and see the expression simplifies
to Equation 6. Thus, consumption smoothing – as long as consumption is even – does not alter our probability
discounting approach for eliciting time preference.
2.2 Background Consumption
In our model, we assume background consumption ω to be constant over the time frame we analyze. This
assumption seems reasonable given our experimental design: all payments were made at either three or
twelve weeks with all payments made during a single semester.4 Given constant background consumption,
we see from Equation 6 that our procedure is invariant to the level of background consumption. In contrast,
elicitation techniques that require estimating and controlling for the curvature of the utility function (e.g.
Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)) are sensitive to the level of background consump-
tion. We report a sensitivity analysis of such estimation to changing levels of background consumption in
Section 4.2.
2.3 Non-exponential Discounting
We assume exponential discounting, but hyperbolic discounting models can also be considered. For exam-
ple, Keller and Strazzera (2002) apply the hyperbolic model axiomatized by Harvey (1986) to obtain the
hyperbolic equivalent of Equation 4 in which
(
1
1+τ
)δ′
replaces
(
1
1+δ
)τ
. Unless utility is linear in wealth,
this approach yields upwardly biased estimates of hyperbolic discount rates. Our approach combined with
the assumption of hyperbolic discounting yields unbiased estimates of δ′.
2.4 Preferences with Non-linear Probabilities
We now consider how our approach is affected if we relax the assumption of linearity in the probabilities
by allowing probability weighting. Suppose we assume that cumulative prospect theory (hereafter CPT)
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) characterizes preferences rather than expected utility theory. Following
CPT, we assume that w(p) is the probability weighting function and V+(m) is the value function for gains,
4Longer time horizons introduce the possibility of background consumption changing over time, which when not accounted
for will bias discount rate estimates. See Noor (2009) for a discussion.
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with V+(0) = 0 and V+(M) increasing in M . CPT does not provide guidance about how to evaluate prospects
that offer both immediate and future payouts, so we maintain our assumption of exponential discounting for
future values and temporal separability. Given these assumptions, Equation 5 becomes
w (pt)V+ (M) + (1− w (pt))V+ (0) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
V+ (0) =
V+ (0) +
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
[w (pt+τ )V+ (M) + (1− w (pt+τ ))V+ (0)] . (5′)
More intuitively, because V+ (0) = 0, this expression becomes
w (pt)V+ (M) =
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
w (pt+τ )V+ (M) , (9)
which shows that an individual is indifferent when the probability-weighted value of winning M at time t is
equal to the discounted probability-weighted value of winning M at time τ . Finally, dividing both sides by
V+ (M) > 0 gives
w (pt) =
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
w (pt+τ ) . (6
′′)
This expression is our CPT analogue to Equation 6 where the probabilities have been replaced with the
weighted probabilities. The advantage of using this expression to estimate discount rate is that we can
avoid estimating the value function V+(m). We will, however, need to estimate w(p), and that will require
additional parametric assumptions. For example, we could assume Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting
function w (p) = e−(− ln p)
γ
and would then need to jointly estimate γ and δ. It is also worth noting that the
importance of neglecting probability weighting will depend on the ratio w(pt)/w(pt+τ ), and this will vary
over the range of probabilities used in the elicitation. In our case, we have set pt = 0.5 and 0.5 < pt+τ < 0.67.
If w(p) is well approximated by a ray through the origin over this range – that is, if there exists α such that
w(p) = αp over the required range for p – then ignoring probability weighting will not appreciably bias our
estimates.
3 Experimental Design
Our experiments are designed to elicit discount rates using the binary lottery payment approach in which
we vary the probability (rather than the prize) over time. We call this the probability task. We also provide
a within-subjects comparison of our “curvature-free” approach to the alternative of jointly estimating the
utility function and discount rates using the joint elicitation procedure of Andersen et al. (2008). Given the
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huge variation of elicited discount rates in the literature, even among studies that adjust for curvature, it
would be reassuring to find that two different methods yield similar results when applied in similar conditions.
We begin by describing our probability discount rate elicitation task and then describe the two tasks we use
as inputs for the joint elicitation comparison.
3.1 Probability Discount Rate Elicitation
In the Probability Discount Rate Task (Task P), subjects choose between a “Sooner” lottery to be played
at time t and “Later” lottery with the same prize but greater chances of paying off.5 The Sooner lottery
offers a 50 percent chance of earning $200 in 3 weeks. The later lottery offers the same cash prize of $200,
but the prize is not paid until 12 weeks after the date of the experimental session. Each subject is presented
with 20 of these paired choices in a multiple price list format. Table 1 (which is not shown to subjects)
shows the choices presented to the subjects, along with associated annual effective interest rates (AEIR) and
implied discount rate ranges.6 In the first Decision row, the Later lottery has the same chances of paying
as the Sooner option, corresponding to a 0 percent interest rate. Moving down the table, the probability of
winning with the Later option increases indicating a higher expected rate of return for waiting the additional
9 weeks. In the last row, Decision 20, the choice is between a 50/50 chance of winning $200 in 3 weeks and a
64.7 percent chance of winning $200 in 12 weeks. In our experiment, interest is compounded daily between
3 and 12 weeks, resulting in an AEIR of between 0 and 346.79 percent across the 20 decisions.
The point at which the subject switches from choosing the Sooner to the Later option reveals the interest
rate the subject must receive in order to be willing to wait for the later lottery. For example, in Decision 15,
the subject must choose between 50 percent chance of receiving $200 in 3 weeks and an 52.7 percent chance
of winning $200 in 12 weeks. In this Decision, the increase in expected payoff from the Sooner to the Later
option represents an annual effective interest rate of 34.97 percent with interest accruing starting 3 weeks
from the experiment date (when the Sooner option pays out) until 12 weeks from the experiment date (when
the Later option pays out). Participants who switch from the Sooner option to the Later option in Decision
15 reveal that their discount rates is between 28.39 and 34.97 percent.
In designing the decision choices in the P Task, we turned to the literature to form our priors about the
key range of discount rates to explore. Estimates that ignore the curvature of the utility function are likely
to be upwardly biased, and the curvature-corrected estimates of Andersen et al. (2008) are on the low end
of the scale. To allow for very low discount rates to be revealed in our decision task, we begin with a zero
AEIR and then increase the chances of winning with the Later option by small amounts. We include the
5In subject instructions and decision sheets, the Sooner option is referred to as Option A and the Later option as Option B.
6The actual decision tables presented to subjects are shown in Appendix A.
8
Table 1: Probability discount rate elicitation (P Task) choices and
implied ranges of discount rates
Chance of Chance of Annual Implied discount rate
$200 in $200 in effective range if switching
3 weeks 12 weeks interest rate in this row
Row (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
1 50.0 50.0 0.00 δ ≤ 0.00
2 50.0 50.1 1.01 0.00 ≤ δ ≤ 1.01
3 50.0 50.2 2.02 1.01 ≤ δ ≤ 2.02
4 50.0 50.4 4.08 2.02 ≤ δ ≤ 4.08
5 50.0 50.5 6.18 4.08 ≤ δ ≤ 6.18
6 50.0 50.7 8.33 6.18 ≤ δ ≤ 8.33
7 50.0 50.9 10.52 8.33 ≤ δ ≤ 10.52
8 50.0 51.1 12.75 10.52 ≤ δ ≤ 12.75
9 50.0 51.2 15.02 12.75 ≤ δ ≤ 15.02
10 50.0 51.4 17.35 15.02 ≤ δ ≤ 17.35
11 50.0 51.6 19.72 17.35 ≤ δ ≤ 19.72
12 50.0 51.8 22.13 19.72 ≤ δ ≤ 22.13
13 50.0 52.0 25.22 22.13 ≤ δ ≤ 25.22
14 50.0 52.2 28.39 25.22 ≤ δ ≤ 28.39
15 50.0 52.7 34.97 28.39 ≤ δ ≤ 34.97
16 50.0 53.6 49.15 34.97 ≤ δ ≤ 49.15
17 50.0 54.5 64.82 49.15 ≤ δ ≤ 64.82
18 50.0 56.9 111.54 64.82 ≤ δ ≤ 111.54
19 50.0 59.4 171.46 111.54 ≤ δ ≤ 171.46
20 50.0 64.7 346.79 171.46 ≤ δ ≤ 346.79
zero interest rate choice in the first Decision Row as a check on whether participants understand the choices
(or perhaps are choosing to wait as a form of enforced savings). While we hypothesize that some individual
discount rates may be very low, we cannot rule out the possibility of shockingly high discount rates that
have been reported in the literature. To allow for a sufficiently broad range of discount rates in our task
without confronting subjects with an unwieldy number of decision rows, we gradually increase the increment
between AEIRs for the higher decision rows.
The payment date for both the Sooner and the Later options are set in the future. This front-end delay
was introduced by Coller and Williams (1999), and it is used to control for transaction costs associated
with returning for payment at a later date and any uncertainty about the reliability of receiving payment
introduced due to the time delay. In our discount rate tasks, subjects choose between receiving payment
in either 3 or 12 weeks. Our subjects were university students and we believe it is important that subjects
receive all payments during the course of one semester. If some subjects expect to graduate or leave the
University between the Sooner and Later payment dates, this would introduce differences in transactions
costs and possibly differences in background consumption between the two payment dates. Therefore the
longest time horizon we could reasonably use was 12 weeks.
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3.2 Joint Elicitation
For our joint elicitation procedure, we adapt the procedures described in Andersen et al. (2008). Utility
curvature is measured using the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference measure (Task R), and discount rates
over dollar amounts are measured using the Coller and Williams (1999) time preference measure (Task D).
Andersen et al. typically presented their subjects with 10 binary decisions per task; however, to be consistent
with our Task P design, we present our subjects with 20 binary decisions in each task.
In the dollar discount rate task (Task D) subjects are shown 20 paired choices between receiving a sum
of money in three weeks and receiving a typically larger sum of money in 12 weeks (see the instructions
and decision table in Appendix A). For each Decision row, the subject is asked to choose between a Sooner
and Later option7; time delays of 3 and 12 weeks are used for consistency with the P-Task decisions. In
all 20 decisions, the Sooner option entails receiving $200 in 3 weeks. For the Later option, the amount
of money the subject would receive in 12 weeks starts at $200 in Decision 1 and increases to $258.96 in
Decision 20. Subjects are also provided the annual interest rates and annual effective interest rates for each
choice in Task D. Coller and Williams argued for including this information because it was available in many
naturally-occurring situations in which individuals make decisions about whether to borrow or lend.8 Table 2
summarizes the 20 choices and shows the AEIR associated with each choice. The AEIRs for each Decision
row in Task P corresponds to that of the same row in Task D. The correspondence between the AEIR rows
for the P Task and the D Task might be a problem if participants tend to switch at the same row across
tasks. Note that under our hypothesis that most participants are risk averse, we predict that participants
will switch to the Later option at an earlier row in the P Task than the D task. Thus, a simple switching
heuristic between decision-making tasks (e.g., always switching in the fifth row) would bias decisions away
from our expected finding.
The risk preference measurement task (Task R) follows procedures first introduced by Holt and Laury
(2002), except that each subject is presented with 20 decisions instead of 10. Each subject is asked to make a
choice between two paired lotteries, labeled Option A and Option B. Option A represents the “safe” lottery
in that there is a relatively small difference between the high and low outcome. Option B represents the
“risky” lottery because there is a relatively large difference between the high and low outcome. Table 3
summarizes the choices given to the subjects, although the range of implied risk aversion was not shown to
subjects. Holt and Laury demonstrated that when the payoff scale is increased, the observed risk aversion
7As in Task P, in subject instructions and decision sheets these were labeled Option A and Option B
8Our pilot experiments had sessions with and without the AEIR information. Excluding this information did not appear
to have substantial affect on the pilot results. Ultimately we decided to exclude the AEIR from the P-Task because there is
no naturally-occurring counterpart for expressing probabilities as interest rates. Coller and Williams (1999) first introduced
the AEIR information to the discount rate task and found that including the AEIR led to lower discount rate estimates and
residual variance.
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Table 2: Dollar discount rate elicitation (D Task) choices and
implied ranges of discount rates
Amount Amount Annual Implied discount rate
paid in paid in effective range if switching
3 weeks 12 weeks interest rate in this row
Row (dollars) (dollars) (percent) (percent)1
1 200.00 200.00 0.00 δ ≤ 0.00
2 200.00 200.35 1.01 0.00 ≤ δ ≤ 1.01
3 200.00 200.69 2.02 1.01 ≤ δ ≤ 2.02
4 200.00 201.39 4.08 2.02 ≤ δ ≤ 4.08
5 200.00 202.08 6.18 4.08 ≤ δ ≤ 6.18
6 200.00 202.78 8.33 6.18 ≤ δ ≤ 8.33
7 200.00 203.48 10.52 8.33 ≤ δ ≤ 10.52
8 200.00 204.18 12.75 10.52 ≤ δ ≤ 12.75
9 200.00 204.89 15.02 12.75 ≤ δ ≤ 15.02
10 200.00 205.60 17.35 15.02 ≤ δ ≤ 17.35
11 200.00 206.31 19.72 17.35 ≤ δ ≤ 19.72
12 200.00 207.02 22.13 19.72 ≤ δ ≤ 22.13
13 200.00 207.92 25.22 22.13 ≤ δ ≤ 25.22
14 200.00 208.82 28.39 25.22 ≤ δ ≤ 28.39
15 200.00 210.62 34.97 28.39 ≤ δ ≤ 34.97
16 200.00 214.29 49.15 34.97 ≤ δ ≤ 49.15
17 200.00 218.01 64.82 49.15 ≤ δ ≤ 64.82
18 200.00 227.61 111.54 64.82 ≤ δ ≤ 111.54
19 200.00 237.62 171.46 111.54 ≤ δ ≤ 171.46
20 200.00 258.96 346.79 171.46 ≤ δ ≤ 346.79
1 These discount rates apply to monetary amounts. If risk neutral, then
these are the the true discount rates.
coefficient increases as well. Therefore, we use monetary outcomes for these lotteries such that the expected
value of the lotteries are (on average) at a scale consistent with the monetary outcomes in the discount rate
task.
Option A involves a chance to receive either $180 or $144, and Option B involves a chance to receive
either $346.50 or $9.9 The chance of receiving the higher-payment outcome starts at 5 percent in Decision
1, and increases to 100 percent in Decision 20 (so in Decision 20 the choice is between $180 and $346.50
with certainty). The point at which the subject switches from Option A to Option B is used to infer an
interval estimate of the subject’s coefficient of risk aversion. A risk neutral subject will choose Option A
as long as its expected value exceeds that of Option B, and then shift to Option B. In this task, the risk
neutral prediction is to choose Option A for the first 8 Decision rows, and then to switch to Option B. A
risk seeking person would choose Option A for fewer than the first 8 Decision rows, and a risk averse person
would choose Option A for more than the first 8 Decision rows.
9These are the same payment levels used by Holt and Laury (2002) in their highest payment treatment.
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Table 3: Risk preference elicitation (R Task) choices and implied CRRA ranges
Lottery A Lottery B
chance chance chance chance Range of relative risk
of $180 of $144 of $346.50 of $9 aversion for u(x) = x
1−r
1−r
Row (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) if switching in this row
1 5 95 5 95 r ≤ −2.48
2 10 90 10 90 −2.48 ≤ r ≤ −1.71
3 15 85 15 85 −1.71 ≤ r ≤ −1.27
4 20 80 20 80 −1.27 ≤ r ≤ −0.95
5 25 75 25 75 −0.95 ≤ r ≤ −0.70
6 30 70 30 70 −0.70 ≤ r ≤ −0.49
7 35 65 35 65 −0.49 ≤ r ≤ −0.31
8 40 60 40 60 −0.31 ≤ r ≤ −0.14
9 45 55 45 55 −0.14 ≤ r ≤ 0.01
10 50 50 50 50 0.01 ≤ r ≤ 0.15
11 55 45 55 45 0.15 ≤ r ≤ 0.28
12 60 40 60 40 0.28 ≤ r ≤ 0.41
13 65 35 65 35 0.41 ≤ r ≤ 0.54
14 70 30 70 30 0.54 ≤ r ≤ 0.68
15 75 25 75 25 0.68 ≤ r ≤ 0.82
16 80 20 80 20 0.82 ≤ r ≤ 0.97
17 85 15 85 15 0.97 ≤ r ≤ 1.15
18 90 10 90 10 1.15 ≤ r ≤ 1.37
19 95 5 95 5 1.37 ≤ r ≤ 1.68
20 100 0 100 0 1.68 ≤ r ≤ 2.25
3.3 Experiment Procedures
A total of 103 subjects participated in six experimental sessions at Georgia State University between Septem-
ber 14 and September 17, 2009. Each subject completed three decision tasks: a probability discount rate
choice task (Task P), a dollar discount rate choice task (Task D), and a risk preference measurement task
(Task R). The discount rate tasks were always given first and the order of those tasks was varied by session.
In three sessions, 51 subjects faced Task P, then Task D, and then Task R. In the remaining three sessions,
52 subjects faced Task D, then Task P, and then Task R.
After subjects had completed all three decision tasks, they were taken individually to a private room to
determine the outcomes (and earnings) from each of the three tasks. In each task, only one of the decision
rows was used in the final payment phase of the experiment. In the instructions subjects were told: “Even
though you will make twenty Decisions, only one of these will end up possibly affecting your earnings, but
you will not know in advance which Decision will be used. Each Decision has an equal chance of being used
for payment.”
After the binding decision was determined, earnings were determined for the task. In the standard
discount rate task over changing dollar amounts, this was simply the dollar amount determined by their
choice of the Sooner option or the Later option in the binding decision. Using Decision 15 as an example, if
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the subject chose the Sooner option, the outcome would be $200 in 3 weeks; if the subject chose the Later
option, the outcome would be $210.62 in 12 weeks.
In the probability discounting task, after the binding decision was selected a die throw was used to
determine whether the outcome was $200 or nothing. Using Decision 15 as an example once more, if the
subject chose the Sooner option, there was a 50 percent chance that the monetary outcome would be $200;
if the subject chose the Later option, there was a 52.7 percent chance that the monetary outcome would be
$200. As described in the subject instructions, three 10-sided die were used to determine the outcome: a
red die was used to determine the hundreds digit, a white die was used to determine the tens digit, and a
blue die was used to determine the ones digit. For example, if the die-roll was a 3 on the red die, a 7 on the
white die, and a 6 on the blue die the outcome was 376.
In the risk preference measurement task, after the binding decision was selected a 20-sided die was used
to determine the monetary outcome. Using Decision 15 as an example, if the subject chose Option A and the
die throw was between 1 and 15, the outcome would be $180, otherwise the outcome would be $144; if the
subject chose Option B and the die throw was between 1 and 15, the outcome would be $346.40, otherwise
the outcome would be $9.
The final payment phase determined whether the subject was paid the monetary outcome in one or more
of the three tasks. There was a 10-percent chance that the subject would be paid in the standard dollar
discount rate task and in the risk preference measurement task. There was a 20-percent chance that the
subject would be paid in the binary-lottery discount rate task.10
Subjects’ earnings in the experiment were the sum of the earnings from the three decision-making tasks
plus a $20 participation payment (because only 10 percent of subjects on average receive payment in any
task, the participation payment was set higher than usual: $5 for arriving to the experiment on time plus
another $5 for each of the three decision-making tasks). Subjects received the participation payment and
any earnings from the risk preference measurement task in cash before leaving the experimental session.
Subjects who received payment from either discount rate tasks received a certificate for payment that could
be redeemed in either 3 or 12 weeks. Subjects who were paid for an Option A choice received payment
during the week of October 5, and subjects who were paid for an Option B choice received payment during
the week of December 7.
Demographic characteristics of our subjects are presented in Table 4. The mean age of the participants
was 21.77 years, ranging from 18 to 47 in the DPR treatment, and from 18 to 46 in the PDR treatment
10This equates the expected value of the payment in the standard and binary-lottery discount rate tasks, as the baseline
probability of payment was only 50 percent in Task P, but 100 percent in the two other tasks. Randomly determining whether
a subject receives payment is used for consistency with earlier discount rate studies, including Coller and Williams (1999) and
Andersen et al. (2008).
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order. Subjects were about equally divided between male and female. The racial makeup of our subject pool
is more diverse than most. About 43 percent reported being white, 35 percent black, and 13 percent Asian.
The demographics appear to be well balanced between sessions. Sorting by treatment order, our analysis
reveals no significant difference by task order, so we combine the the data for the analysis reported here.
Table 4: Demographic characteristics.
Demographic All Order Order
Characteristic Participants DPR PDR
Average Age 21.77 21.78 21.76
Percent Male 51.4 49 54
Percent White 43 41 44
Percent Black 35 35 35
Percent Asian 13 12 13
Percent Raised in US 92 92 92
Percent Freshman 10 4 15
Percent Sophomore 31 33 29
Percent Junior 42 45 38
Percent Senior 17 16 17
Average GPA 3.23 3.19 3.27
4 Results
First, we turn to an overview of our data and then present results from maximum likelihood estimation.
Figure 1 displays the proportion of subjects selecting the Sooner payment option (payment in 3 weeks) in
each of the 20 decisions. Recall that the AEIR increases as the subject moves down the decision sheet so that
a greater number of Sooner choices implies a higher discount rate. Lines with square markers show the data
for Task D (the standard dollar discount rate task), and lines with circle markers show the data for Task
P (the binary lottery payment discount rate task). We see that participants appear much more impatient
(a much higher proportion of subjects choose the Sooner option in each decision) when given the standard
dollar discounting task than when given the probability discounting task. If subjects are risk neutral (that
is, if utility is linear in wealth), then we expect to find the same discount rates in each task. Instead, we see
that discount rates are higher in Task D than in Task P. For example, in Decision 6, 80 percent of subjects
choose the Sooner option in Task D, compared to 50 percent of the same subjects who choose the Sooner
option in Task P. This pattern is what we expect if participants have utility that is concave in wealth. In
this case, we expect that the discount rate from the standard dollar task will overstate the true discount
rate.
Based on the pattern of responses from the two discount rate tasks, we expect to find that the average
participant is our study is risk averse. Table 5 shows the average responses for each task and confirms our
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Figure 1: Proportion of subjects selecting the Sooner option (option A) by decision row and treatment.
Table 5: Number of Safer (Task R) and Sooner (Task P and D) Choices
in each Task
Standard
Task Mean Median Deviation
Risk aversion (Task R) 13.24 14 3.47
Standard dollar discounting (task D) 13.04 14 4.92
Binary lottery payment discounting (task P) 7.88 8 5.60
hypothesis that the average participant has concave rather than linear preferences. In the risk aversion task,
participants choose Option A, the “safe” choice that offers a lower variance in payoffs, for an average of 13
decisions. The risk neutral prediction is to choose Option A for the first 8 Decision rows, and then to switch
to Option B. These results indicate a coefficient of relative risk aversion in the range of 0.41 to 0.54. These
results are also consistent with the degree of risk aversion found by Holt and Laury (2002) for similar stakes.
Given risk averse participants, we expect to find a difference in average discount rates in Task D and
Task P. Indeed, in Task D, subjects chose the Sooner option for an average of 13.0 decisions, compared to
7.9 Sooner choices for Task P. Because subjects made choices in both tasks, we can test for differences in
the central tendency of choices using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. This is a relatively
powerful test of the differences between the two treatments that uses both the sign of the difference between a
subject’s choices in the two tasks and the size of the difference. The null hypothesis of no difference between
the two tasks is rejected at any standard level of confidence.
Turning our attention to those subjects who do not exhibit multiple switch points between the Sooner
and Later options, Table 6 shows the portion of participants who switch in each decision row for each task.11
In Task P we see a substantial portion of participants (33.7 percent) chose to switch in Decision 2, the first
11It is common to exclude multi-switchers from analyses that focus on a single switch point. An advantage of the maximum
likelihood estimation that follows is that we can add error terms to the model and include all decisions.
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decision that yields a positive rate of interest.12 This is consistent with a discount rate between 0 and 1.01
percent. Given contemporaneous market rates of interest,13 low discount rates are entirely plausible, and
yet, rarely seen in the literature on elicited discount rates. When we use the data from Task D, which does
not account for the curvature in the utility function, we do not find such low discount rates. Instead we find
only a handful of individuals willing to save until the interest rate is at least 6 percent.
Table 6: Distributions of switching behavior across tasks
Risk task Discounting Tasks
Proportion Range of discount Proportion switching
Range of relative switching rate if switching in this row
risk aversion if in this row in this row Task D Task P
Row switching in this row1 (percent)2 (percent)3 (percent)4 (percent)5
1 r ≤ −2.48 0.0 δ ≤ 0.00 2.5 1.30
2 −2.48 ≤ r ≤ −1.71 0.0 0.00 ≤ δ ≤ 1.01 2.5 33.77
3 −1.71 ≤ r ≤ −1.27 0.0 1.01 ≤ δ ≤ 2.02 0.0 2.60
4 −1.27 ≤ r ≤ −0.95 0.0 2.02 ≤ δ ≤ 4.08 0.0 1.30
5 −0.95 ≤ r ≤ −0.70 0.0 4.08 ≤ δ ≤ 6.18 1.2 3.90
6 −0.70 ≤ r ≤ −0.49 0.0 6.18 ≤ δ ≤ 8.33 4.9 7.79
7 −0.49 ≤ r ≤ −0.31 1.3 8.33 ≤ δ ≤ 10.52 1.2 1.30
8 −0.31 ≤ r ≤ −0.14 0.0 10.52 ≤ δ ≤ 12.75 1.2 7.79
9 −0.14 ≤ r ≤ 0.01 1.3 12.75 ≤ δ ≤ 15.02 3.7 1.30
10 0.01 ≤ r ≤ 0.15 12.5 15.02 ≤ δ ≤ 17.35 3.7 3.90
11 0.15 ≤ r ≤ 0.28 7.5 17.35 ≤ δ ≤ 19.72 1.2 3.90
12 0.28 ≤ r ≤ 0.41 3.8 19.72 ≤ δ ≤ 22.13 3.7 5.19
13 0.41 ≤ r ≤ 0.54 3.8 22.13 ≤ δ ≤ 25.22 3.7 2.60
14 0.54 ≤ r ≤ 0.68 6.3 25.22 ≤ δ ≤ 28.39 2.5 2.60
15 0.68 ≤ r ≤ 0.82 16.3 28.39 ≤ δ ≤ 34.97 12.4 1.30
16 0.82 ≤ r ≤ 0.97 10.0 34.97 ≤ δ ≤ 49.15 9.9 5.19
17 0.97 ≤ r ≤ 1.15 13.8 49.15 ≤ δ ≤ 64.82 8.6 2.60
18 1.15 ≤ r ≤ 1.37 5.0 64.82 ≤ δ ≤ 111.54 17.3 6.49
19 1.37 ≤ r ≤ 1.68 10.0 111.54 ≤ δ ≤ 171.46 4.9 2.60
20 1.68 ≤ r ≤ 2.25 7.5 171.46 ≤ δ ≤ 346.79 8.6 0.00
1 Assuming u(x) = x
1−r
1−r .
2 Including only the 80 of 103 subjects who did not multiswitch in R Task. One subject always
chose Lottery B implying a risk aversion parameter of at least 2.25.
3 These discount rates apply to monetary amounts for the D task and to the true discount rates
over utility for the P Task. If risk neutral, then these are the same across tasks.
4 Including only the 81 of 103 subjects who did not multiswitch in the D task. Five subjects always
chose the Sooner option implying a discount rate over money of at least 346.79 percent.
5 Including only the 77 of 103 subjects who did not multiswitch in the P task. Two subjects always
chose the Sooner option implying a discount rate of at least 346.79 percent.
Overall, our results indicate that using probabilities to elicit discount rates (Task P) reduces the upward
bias caused by the assumption of linear utility in the more standard (dollar) discount rate elicitation method.
12In a pilot experiment with the P Task that did not include a zero percent interest rate choice (Morgan, 2009), 45.7 percent of
participants choose Option B for all decisions implying a discount rate of less than 2.02 percent. The pilot experiments differed
in other important dimensions (including lower stakes, shorter time horizon, AEIR provided in some sessions, and conducted
at different university); yet, the pilot results are broadly consistent with the findings we report here.
13At the time the experiment was conducted, interest rates were quite low. For example, Bankrate.com’s weekly survey of
banks conducted October 21, 2009, found a yield for one-year CD of only 0.92 percent. http://www.bankrate.com/finance/
cd/national-cd-rate-averages8-134136.aspx
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The next section examines this issue more formally and allows a direct comparison of the discount rate elicited
in Task P with the curvature-corrected discount rate obtained via joint-estimation of the parameters of the
utility function.
4.1 Model Estimation
We now turn to our estimation procedures. First, we describe the likelihood functions for the probability
discount rate estimation and the joint estimation. Next, we report the estimation results and consider the
sensitivity to changing values of background consumption. And finally, we introduce probability weighting
into the estimation to gauge robustness to allowing for preferences that are non-linear in both probabilities
and wealth.
4.1.1 Probability Discount Rate Model Specification
We now construct a likelihood function for our Task P time preference choices. Returning to our normaliza-
tion used to derive Equation 6, we define the normalized present value for each lottery presented in a Task P
choice. Recall that lottery A provided payoff at future time t, and lottery B provided payoff at future time
t+ τ . The present value of lottery A is
NPVA =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
× pA (10)
and the present value of lottery B is
NPVB =
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
× pB (11)
where pi is the probability of earning the larger payoff in lottery i. We use these normalized present value
expressions to construct a probabilistic choice rule for the P Task decisions.14 We let PrPi (A) be the
probability of choosing outcome A over outcome B in choice i of Task P, and express this as
PrPi (A) =
NPV
1/ξ
A
NPV
1/ξ
A + NPV
1/ξ
B
(12)
where ξ is a noise parameter that relates the sensitivity of choice probabilities to payoffs. Note that ξ → 0
implies the lottery with larger expected value is given full weight, while ξ →∞ implies purely random choice
with each lottery receiving equal weight. The conditional log likelihood function for time preference decisions
14This is the same stochastic choice specification used by Holt and Laury (2002). See Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008, Sections
2.2 and 2.3) for further discussion of stochastic error terms, and see Wilcox (2008) for a thorough discission of stochastic models
under risk.
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is
ln LP(δ, ξ; y) =
∑
i
((
ln(PrPi (A)|yi = A
)
+
(
ln(1− PrPi (A)|yi = B
))
(13)
where yi = j denotes selection of lottery j in observation i.
4.1.2 Joint Estimation Model Specification
Our specification for joint estimation of risk and time preferences generally follows from Andersen et al.
(2008). First, we specify the likelihood function for choices made in the risk task to estimate the risk
parameter, r. Each pairwise choice made in the risk task was between two lotteries, and each lottery had
two possible outcomes. For each lottery i, we write outcome j as Mij and we let the probability of this
outcome be p(Mij). We express the expected utility of a given lottery as
EUi =
∑
j=1,2
p(Mij)× U(ω +Mij). (14)
In order to specify a likelihood function for joint estimation, we must first assume a parametric form for
utility. Note that this assumption is not required for the probability discounting likelihood function defined
above in Equation 13. We assume the CRRA form for utility and that the risk coefficient r does not vary
over the time period under consideration. We now rewrite EUi as
EUi =
∑
j=1,2
p(Mij)× (ω +Mij)
1−r
1− r . (14
′)
We introduce probabilistic choice function PrRi (A) as the probability of a subject choosing lottery A
instead of lottery B in choice i of task R, and define the probability as
PrRi (A) =
EU
1/µ
A
EU
1/µ
A + EU
1/µ
B
, (15)
where µ is the associated behavioral noise parameter. We now write the conditional log-likelihood function
as
ln LR(r, µ; y, ω) =
∑
i
((
ln(PrRi (A)|yi = A
)
+
(
ln(1− PrRi (A)|yi = B
))
, (16)
where yi = j denotes selection of lottery j in observation i.
Next, we construct a similar likelihood function for time preferences by using the D Task choices. Recall
that each of these choices consisted of two options: option A provided monetary amount MA at time t, and
option B paid MB at time t + τ . By assuming CRRA as the form of the utility function as before, we can
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rewrite Equations 1 and 2 as
PVA =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
× (ω +MA)
1−r
1− r +
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
× ω
1−r
1− r (1
′)
and
PVB =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
× ω
1−r
1− r +
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
× (ω +MB)
1−r
1− r . (2
′)
We now use these present values to construct another probabilistic choice rule – this time for the D task
choices. We let PrDi (A) be the probability of a subject choosing outcome A instead of outcome B in choice
i of task D, and define this probability as
PrDi (A) =
PV
1/ν
A
PV
1/ν
A + PV
1/ν
B
, (17)
where ν is a noise parameter as before. We now write the conditional log-likelihood function for choices from
the time discounting task D as
ln LD(δ, r, µ, ν; y, ω) =
∑
i
((
ln(PrDi (A)|yi = A
)
+
(
ln(1− PrDi (A)|yi = B
))
, (18)
where yi = j denotes selection of outcome j in choice i.
By combining Equations 16 and 18, we can write the joint log likelihood as
ln L(δ, r, µ, ν; y, ω) = ln LR + ln LD. (19)
The joint likelihood above allows for nonlinear preferences over wealth. We can impose the assumption of risk
neutrality on our data by re-estimating the equation above with the constraint that the CRRA coefficient is
equal to one. The results from the constrained estimation serve as our benchmark for gauging the sensitivity
of our discount rates estimates to nonlinearity in the utility function.
4.1.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results
We maximize the likelihood functions defined above with version 10 of the Stata statistical software applica-
tion.15 Because each subject provided 20 responses for each of the three tasks, we allow for within-subject
clustered standard errors. Table 7 presents our maximum-likelihood estimates. We estimate an aggregate
annual discount rate of 12.2 percent with the probability discounting (Task P) specification. The 95 percent
confidence interval bounds put the estimate between 4.6 percent and 19.7 percent. This is on the lower end of
15Both the data and estimation routines are available at http://www.excen.gsu.edu/swarthout/LMSV/
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Table 7: Estimates of risk and time preferences, assuming zero background consumption
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Parameter Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
Probability Discounting Estimation (Task P)
δ 0.122 0.039 0.000 0.046 0.197
ξ 0.045 0.008 0.000 0.030 0.060
Joint Estimation Constrained to Risk Neutrality (Task D)
δ 0.555 0.066 0.000 0.418 0.674
ν 0.041 0.004 0.000 0.033 0.050
Joint estimation (Tasks R and D)
r 0.702 0.069 0.000 0.567 0.838
δ 0.141 0.038 0.000 0.066 0.215
µ 0.132 0.026 0.000 0.081 0.183
ν 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.019
previous estimates, and we wish to know how much higher our estimate would be had we followed the earlier
literature in assuming risk neutrality. To do this, we use the joint estimation likelihood function described
above but constrain the CRRA coefficient to be equal to one. These estimates are shown in the middle of
Table 7. The maximum likelihood point estimate under the assumption of risk linear preferences is 55.5 per-
cent with a lower 95 percent confidence interval bound of 41.8 percent. Thus, we find that there is no overlap
between the confidence intervals between the two estimation techniques. Failing to control for risk aversion
drastically overstates the degree of impatience in our sample. Our lower estimates from the probability task
are more plausible in theory and in comparison to naturally-occurring rates. Our estimate is also in line
with the 10.1 percent found by Andersen et al. (2008) in their nationally representative sample of adult
Danes using the joint estimation technique to account for curvature. Nonetheless, it is quite a surprise to
find this degree of patience among US undergraduates. To see whether this unexpected result is an anomaly
of the elicitation procedure, we turn to the within-subjects comparison of results from unconstrained joint
estimation.
We begin by looking at the estimates of risk aversion in the jointly-estimated model. The risk coefficient
is estimated to be 0.702 and the confidence interval does not include zero. This confirms the hypothesis
that our subjects are risk averse. Given this evidence of curvature of the utility function, we expect that the
unconstrained jointly-estimated discount rate will be significantly lower than the joint estimation constrained
to risk neutrality. Indeed, the discount rate is found to be 14.1 percent when utility curvature in taken into
account compared to 55.5 percent when utility is assumed to be linear. The discount rate we found in our P
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task is slightly lower; however, the confidence intervals for the two estimates have substantial overlap. The
two estimates are also very similar in terms of precision.
The estimates of the behavioral error terms ξ, ν, and µ in Table 7 exhibit an interesting pattern. Recall
that estimates of zero indicate that no noise is present in the decision process. In all tasks and specifications,
we find evidence of some noise: none of the confidence intervals include zero. We find the estimated amount
of noise is highest in the risk aversion task and lowest in the dollar discounting task. Andersen et al. (2008)
also find a larger estimate of noise for the risk aversion task than the discount rate task and hypothesize
that the risk aversion tasks were cognitively harder. The estimated noise in our probability discounting task
is intermediate suggesting a more difficult task than dollar discounting but still cognitively easier than the
risk aversion task of Holt and Laury (2002).
4.2 Sensitivity to Background Consumption
The probability discounting estimates developed in this paper are independent of the level of background
consumption. Alternative estimation techniques, including those of Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012), require an estimate of background consumption in order to estimate and control for the
curvature of the utility function. For the above estimates, we assumed that ω = 0, but we can easily vary
this assumption to gauge the sensitivity of our estimates. Andersen et al. (2008) find that their estimated
discount rates are not very sensitive to the assumed level of ω, while Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find
estimated discount rates double when estimated daily consumption is varied between $3.52 to $14.09. We
show in Figure 2 the range of estimated average discount rates as the level of background consumption
is varied.16 We see that discount rates from joint estimation increase from a low of 14.2 percent that we
report in Table 7 to a high of about 20 percent as the background consumption parameter is increased. The
estimated discount rate from our P Task do not vary with the assumed level of back ground consumption
and are closest to the joint estimation results when background consumption is assumed to be zero.
4.3 Probability Weighting
We now relax our prior assumption that the utility function is linear in probabilities. We assume the
probability weighting function to have the form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), with
w (p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ
(20)
for 0 < p < 1, w (0) = 0, and w (1) = 1.
16In comparing Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) to our results, note that in their model ω has the opposite sign to ours.
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Figure 2: Estimated discount rates as daily background consumption varies between zero and ten dollars.
We use a joint estimation technique by combining subject responses from all three tasks to estimate
the three unknown parameters: (i) the γ of probability weighting function, (ii) the curvature parameter of
the utility function r, and the discounting parameter δ. Essentially this estimation approach boils down to
using three equations to solve for three unknowns. The responses in each decision task depend on different
combinations of two of the three unknown parameters, and it is only by combining all three tasks that we
can identify all three parameters.
We proceed by modifying the log likelihood expressions associated with the two tasks involving un-
certainty: the risk task and the binary payoff lottery discounting task. We first modify Equation 14′ by
introducing the probability weighting function and denoting the higher paying outcome as Mi1, to give us
wEUi = w (p (Mi1))× (ω +Mi1)
1−r
1− r + (1− w (p (Mi1)))×
(ω +Mi2)
1−r
1− r . (14
′′)
Thus, Equation 15 becomes
wPr
R
i (A) =
wEU
1/µ
A
wEU
1/µ
A + wEU
1/µ
B
. (15′)
And finally we have a modified log-likelihood function with probability weighting for the choices from the
risk task, given as
ln wL
R(r, µ, γ; y, ω) =
∑
i
((
ln(wPr
R
i (A)|yi = A
)
+
(
ln(1− wPrRi (A)|yi = B
))
. (16′)
Similarly, we allow for probability weighting by constructing a modified log likelihood function for the P task
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choices. Following the derivation given in Equation 6′′, Equations 10 and 11 become
wNPVA =
(
1
1 + δ
)t
× w (pA) (10′)
and
wNPVB =
(
1
1 + δ
)t+τ
× w (pB) . (11′)
This allows us to reexpress Equation 12 as
wPr
P
i (A) =
wNPV
1/ξ
A
wNPV
1/ξ
A + wNPV
1/ξ
B
. (12′)
And now we have a log likelihood function for the P Task choices which allows for probability weighting,
and is expressed as
ln wL
P(δ, ξ, γ; y) =
∑
i
((
ln(wPr
P
i (A)|yi = A
)
+
(
ln(1− wPrPi (A)|yi = B
))
(13′)
Because there is no uncertainty in the dollar discounting task, the likelihood contribution from the D Task
data is unchanged by allowing for probability weighting. That is, ln wL
D = ln LD. Thus, we can express a
joint log likelihood function for all three tasks as
ln wL(δ, r, γ, µ, ν, ξ; y, ω) = ln wL
R + ln wL
D + ln wL
P. (21)
Table 8: Estimates of Risk and Time Preferences with Probability Weighting
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Parameter Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
r 0.722 0.062 0.000 0.601 0.843
δ 0.130 0.031 0.000 0.068 0.191
γ 0.996 0.098 0.000 0.804 1.187
µ 0.126 0.023 0.000 0.080 0.171
ν 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.017
ξ 0.045 0.008 0.000 0.028 0.061
The results of estimation allowing for probability weighting are shown in Table 8. The estimated discount
rate of 13.0 percent is almost identical to that found when we assume probability weighting is absent. The
CRRA coefficient is also similar to what we find when we use only the D Task and R Task data and assume no
probability weighting. These results suggest that probability weighting has little impact in our experiment,
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and this is borne out by the fact that the confidence interval for γ includes 1. That is, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that preferences are linear in probabilities. These results may be sensitive to our choice of
probability weighting function, but we defer a more thorough exploration of parameterizations in the manner
of Stott (2006) for a later date. Future work should also consider the link between an individual’s probability
weighting and hyperbolicity of time preferences as suggested by the findings of Epper et al. (2011).
5 Sensitivity Test of Payment Delay
A striking feature of these data is the large proportion of subjects who are willing to delay receiving payment
at the lowest possible positive interest rate in the Probability Discount Rate Task. We do not observe this
behavioral pattern in the Dollar Discount Rate Task in which discount rates are higher. The mean discount
rate from the P-Task is 10.52-12.75 percent, but over one-third of all subjects reveal an individual discount
rate below 1.01 percent. These subjects choose a 50.1 percent chance to earn $200 in 12 weeks over a 50.0
percent chance to earn $200 in 3 weeks.
We find it surprising that so many subjects respond so strongly to such a small increase in probability
that they are willing to wait an additional nine weeks to receive payment. Because the joint-estimation
technique yields only an aggregate curvature-free estimate of the discount rate, we cannot compare the
distribution of individual discount rates obtained in the P Task to data from our jointly-estimated tasks. It
is possible that this behavioral pattern may be the result of the specific parameters used for our probability
discounting elicitation method in the first experiment. We conduct a second experiment to gauge sensitivity
to parameter choices.
5.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We implement four treatments in our second experiment (hereafter Experiment 2) to explore whether elicited
discount rates are sensitive to the length of time participants must wait for payment. We manipulate both
the horizon (i.e., the delay between the Sooner and Later payment dates) and the front-end delay (FED)
(i.e., the waiting period before the payment date of the Sooner option). Table 9 defines the treatments.
While our first experiment had a 3 week FED to hold constant the transaction costs and risks of receiving
payment, our new experiment has FEDs of 2 weeks, 1 day, or 0 (i.e., payment is made at the end of the session
before the subject leaves the laboratory). If preferences are hyperbolic (Ainslie, 1992) or quasi-hyperbolic
(Laibson, 1997), then we expect to find that elicited discount rates will increase as the FED is reduced. Prior
experimental research on the effects of the FED are mixed: Coller and Williams (1999) find that eliminating
the FED significantly increases discount rates, while Anderson and Stafford (2009) find that reducing the
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FED to 1 day has no significant effects. We also vary the time horizon from 7 weeks to 1 week to investigate
whether horizon influences the discount rate.
Table 9: Experiment 2 Treatments
Treatment Front-End Delay (days) Horizon (days)
Experiment 1 21 63
Baseline (Task A) 14 49
No FED (Task B) 0 49
Short FED (Task C) 1 49
Short Horizon (Task D) 14 7
Note that the baseline treatment uses a 2 week FED and a 7 week horizon, which is slightly shorter in both
dimensions than our previous experiment. Comparing discount rates from Experiment 1 and the baseline
for Experiment 2 will give us a gauge on whether the discount rate distribution is excessively sensitive to
the specific parameters chosen in Experiment 1.
Table 10 shows the probabilities of payment for the Later option given on the decision sheet for each
treatment and the implied discount rate ranges. We use the results from Experiment 1 to inform our choice
of discount rate intervals in the current experiment. In Experiment 1, 60 percent of subjects switch to the
later payment date by Row 8, with switch points after this roughly evenly distributed across decision rows.
Therefore, in Experiment 2 we keep the discount rate intervals the same as in Experiment 1 for the first
8 rows, but use wider intervals for the remaining decisions (and eliminate the very highest discount rate
intervals where we see very little switching in Experiment 1).
We modify the procedures and instructions slightly for the new experiment. First, subjects make only
P-Task elicitation decisions. Second, prior to subjects making any decisions, we go through two examples
of how payoffs are determined with a sample P-Task decision sheet in the instructions. The parameters in
the sample decision sheet differed from those used in the actual experiment. Third, we add a cover sheet
to each task to draw attention to the time dimension for the choices in that task. One possible explanation
for our Experiment 1 data is that some subjects may not have fully considered the time horizon difference
and instead focused only on the probability of receiving payment. If this is so, then subjects would be more
likely to switch to the Later option whenever it had the higher probability of payment. The cover sheet
included the payment amount (which was fixed across all tasks) and the payment dates but did not include
the probabilities. For example, the cover sheet for the baseline treatment stated:
Before Making Any Decisions in This Task, Please Note:
Your choice in this Task is between two options that offer a chance of being paid $100 at different
times this semester.
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Table 10: Experiment 2 choices and implied ranges of dis-
count rates.
Chance of receiving $100
from Later option(percent)
Baseline, Range of discount rate
NoFED, if switching in
Row ShortFED ShortHorizon this row (percent)
1 50.00 50.00 δ ≤ 0.00
2 50.07 50.01 0.00 ≤ δ ≤ 1.01
3 50.13 50.02 1.01 ≤ δ ≤ 2.02
4 50.27 50.04 2.02 ≤ δ ≤ 4.08
5 50.40 50.06 4.08 ≤ δ ≤ 6.18
6 50.54 50.08 6.18 ≤ δ ≤ 8.33
7 50.68 50.10 8.33 ≤ δ ≤ 10.52
8 50.81 50.12 10.52 ≤ δ ≤ 12.75
9 51.09 50.15 12.75 ≤ δ ≤ 17.35
0 51.36 50.19 17.35 ≤ δ ≤ 22.13
11 51.71 50.24 22.13 ≤ δ ≤ 28.39
12 52.05 50.29 28.39 ≤ δ ≤ 34.97
13 52.76 50.38 34.97 ≤ δ ≤ 49.15
14 55.29 50.72 49.15 ≤ δ ≤ 111.54
Note: the chance of receiving $100 from the Sooner option is
always 50%.
Payment for Option A will be in 14 days (2 weeks) – on Tuesday, October 11
Payment for Option B will be in 63 days (7 weeks) – on Tuesday, November 29
If you have any questions, raise your hand and one of us will come to you.
This experiment was conducted in two sessions on Tuesday, September 27, 2011. The sessions were held
on the same day so that all future dates were held constant across sessions. We purposefully chose to conduct
the experiment on a Tuesday so that all future payment dates were either on a Tuesday or Wednesday, when
most students are already on campus. We also ensured that none of the future payment dates conflicted
with a holiday or final exams. A total of 75 undergraduate students participated.
In the new experiment, subjects participated in four decision-making tasks. Because they completed one
additional task (relative to Experiment 1), we reduced the number of decisions subjects made from 20 to 14
in each of the four tasks. All subjects made decisions in all four tasks, but we randomly varied the order of
tasks for each subject. After all four tasks were completed, subjects filled out a demographic questionnaire
and then were paid privately their experiment earnings.
To determine experiment earnings, one of the four decision-making tasks was randomly chosen to count
for payment. For this chosen decision-making task, a die-throw determined which one of the 14 decisions
would count for payment. For this selected decision, the subject’s choice of the Sooner or Later payment
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Figure 3: Proportion of subjects choosing the Sooner option (option A) in Experiment 2 by decision row
and treatment.
determined the probability of earning $100 (and on what date). A final die throw determined whether the
subject earned $100 or nothing.
In addition to these experiment earnings ($100 or nothing), each subject also received a $25 participation
payment ($5 for each of the four tasks plus $5 for completing the demographic questionnaire). Thus, each
subject earned either $25 or $125.
5.2 Results
Figure 3 displays the proportion of subjects selecting the Sooner payment in each of the 14 decisions for each
treatment. Recall that the AEIR increases as the subject moves down the decision sheet so that a greater
number of Sooner choices implies a higher discount rate. In all treatments, there is a sizeable drop in the
fraction of subjects choosing the Sooner option between the first and second decisions, which corresponds
to an increase in the AEIR from 0 percent to 1 percent. This is similar to the pattern we saw in Figure 1
for the P-Task data in the corresponding interest rate range. As the AEIR is raised further, we see that
the portion selecting the Sooner option continues to drop but at a more gradual pace. In comparing across
the treatments, the No FED treatment typically has a higher proportion of Sooner choices at any decision
row relative to the Baseline while the other treatments are less obviously distinct. Wilcoxon Signed Rank
tests comparing the distribution of the number of Sooner responses confirm this pattern. Table 11 reports
these tests. We observe statistically significant present bias only for the No FED treatment. For the Short
FED and Short Horizon treatments, we cannot reject the null that the distribution of the number of Sooner
choices is the same relative to the Baseline treatment.
This pattern of behavior can also be seen in Table 12, which shows switching behavior and implied
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Table 11: Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests of equal distributions. All tests are
two-tailed.
All subjects Excluding multiswitchers
Test n z prob > |z| n z prob > |z|
Baseline = No FED 75 -2.019 0.0435 53 -1.749 0.0803
Baseline = Short FED 75 -0.586 0.5579 52 -0.838 0.4019
Baseline = Short Horizon1 74 -1.079 0.2805 53 -1.250 0.2112
1 We exclude one subject who circled both options on row 5 of the Short Horizon treatment.
discount ranges in each of our four new treatments.17 The overall pattern of behavior is quite similar to
that observed with the parameters used in Experiment 1: the modal discount rate is between 0.00 and 1.01
percent, and the vast majority of subjects make choices consistent with a discount rate below 12.75 percent.
We do see differences, however. In the Baseline treatment, just over 30 percent of all subjects exhibit a
discount rate below 1.01 percent, which is lower than the 33.8 percent shown in Table 6. When there is no
front-end delay, this falls substantially: just 22.03 percent of subjects exhibit a discount rate below 1.01.
Elicited discount rates fall between these extremes for our other two treatments, short FED (24.56 percent
of subjects show a discount rate below 1.01 percent) and short horizon (27.58 percent of subjects with a
discount rate below 1.01 percent). Overall, it appears that discount rates are more sensitive to the front-
end-delay than the time-horizon between payment periods. We continue to investigate the effect of FED and
horizon with a structural model in the next section.
5.2.1 Structural Estimation
We design the estimation procedure specifically to test for treatment effects. We construct binary indi-
cator variables for each of the non-Baseline treatments18 and otherwise follow the model specification of
Section 4.1.1. Estimating this model will provide us with a parameter estimate of δB , the discount rate
associated with baseline observations, as well as the additive change in the discount rate associated with
each of the non-baseline treatments, as given by δNF , δSF , and δSH .
Table 13 reports the maximum likelihood estimation of this model specification. We see that the discount
rate associated with the Baseline treatment is 11.3 percent, which is very close to the 12.2 percent discount
rate obtained from the prior experiment P-Task estimation. Further, the confidence intervals associated with
both of these estimates are nearly identical. We view this similarity as a successful replication of the P-task
results from the first experiment.
17As with Table 6, subjects who switch more than once are excluded from this tabulation.
18d NF is equal to 1 if an observation is from the No FED treatment, 0 otherwise; d SF is equal to 1 if an observation
is from the Short FED treatment, 0 otherwise; d SH is equal to 1 if an observation is from the Short Horizon treatment, 0
otherwise. We now express the discount rate as δ = δB + δNF × d NF+ δSF × d SF+ δSH × d SH.
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Table 12: Experiment 2 choices, implied discount rate ranges, and switching
behavior by treatment.
Range of discount
rate if switching Proportion switching in
in this row this row (percent)
Row (percent) Baseline1 NoFED2 ShortFED3 ShortHorizon4
1 δ ≤ 0.00 3.57 1.69 3.51 5.17
2 0.00 ≤ δ ≤ 1.01 26.79 20.34 21.05 22.41
3 1.01 ≤ δ ≤ 2.02 10.71 10.17 12.28 3.45
4 2.02 ≤ δ ≤ 4.08 3.57 10.17 7.02 6.90
5 4.08 ≤ δ ≤ 6.18 1.79 3.39 1.75 3.45
6 6.18 ≤ δ ≤ 8.33 5.36 3.39 5.26 5.17
7 8.33 ≤ δ ≤ 10.52 3.57 1.69 3.51 13.79
8 10.52 ≤ δ ≤ 12.75 5.36 0.00 7.02 6.90
9 12.75 ≤ δ ≤ 17.35 10.71 8.47 8.77 1.72
0 17.35 ≤ δ ≤ 22.13 1.79 3.39 0.00 0.00
11 22.13 ≤ δ ≤ 28.39 3.57 0.00 5.26 5.17
12 28.39 ≤ δ ≤ 34.97 1.79 10.17 7.02 0.00
13 34.97 ≤ δ ≤ 49.15 5.36 3.39 1.75 3.45
14 49.15 ≤ δ ≤ 111.54 7.14 10.17 5.26 8.62
1 Including only the 56 subjects who did not multiswitch. Five subjects always chose
the Sooner option, implying a discount rate of at least 111.54 percent.
2 Including only the 59 subjects who did not multiswitch. Eight subjects always chose
the Sooner option, implying a discount rate of at least 111.54 percent.
3 Including only the 57 subjects who did not multiswitch. Six subjects always chose
the Sooner option, implying a discount rate of at least 111.54 percent.
4 Including only the 58 subjects who did not multiswitch. Eight subjects always chose
the Sooner option, implying a discount rate of at least 111.54 percent.
Table 13: Estimation of time preferences in Experiment 2 allowing for treatment effects
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Standard Confidence Confidence
Parameter Estimate Error p-value Interval Interval
δB 0.113 0.035 0.001 0.044 0.183
δNF 1.574 0.322 0.000 0.943 2.205
δSF 1.049 0.197 0.000 0.663 1.435
δSH 0.000 0.001 0.852 -0.002 0.002
ξ 0.027 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.035
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We now examine treatment effects. The most extreme effect is the increased discount rate in the No FED
treatment; having no delay for the sooner payment increases the estimated discount rate to 168.7 percent.
Similarly, a one day FED results in an estimated discount rate of 116.2 percent. Both of these treatment
effects are significant at any standard level of confidence. Because future payments have higher transaction
costs and risks, we expect the discount rate to increase when the FED is eliminated (Coller and Williams,
1999). Considering only the no FED treatment, we cannot disentangle the effects of transaction costs from
a “passion for the present.” However, by comparing the no FED and one-day FED results, we infer that
a “passion for the present” accounts for at least two-thirds of the observed discount rate increase in the
No FED treatment. Finally, we estimate no change from the baseline discount rate in the Short Horizon
treatment; the estimated effect associated with this treatment is less than 0.1 percent.
Much of the literature finding evidence in favor of hyperbolic over exponential discounting has relied
on parametric assumptions about the utility function (Rohde, 2010). Our estimation results do not require
such assumptions, and so provide new evidence against constant discounting, particularly when there is the
chance at an immediate or one-day payment. However, if the soonest payment date is at least two weeks in
the future, then we do not reject constant discounting in Experiment 2. Moreover, we also see that discount
rates are in the same range across Experiment 1 and the Baseline treatment of Experiment 2. These results
suggest that over this time range, the exponential model may be a reasonable local approximation of time
preferences.
6 Conclusion
We develop a simple probability-based elicitation of time preferences and find a surprisingly low discount
rate relative to the literature. The advantage of varying probabilities rather than prizes is that if expected
utility is linear in probabilities, we can avoid the issues associated with estimating and correcting for the
curvature of the utility function. Using the probability discounting elicitation method, we find average
discounts rates of 12.2 percent in the first experiment and 11.3 percent in the second experiment when the
front-end delay is at least two weeks. Because of the huge variation of discount rate estimates in the literature
– even for those that address the curvature confound and, like ours, use real-valued rewards – we conduct a
within-subjects comparison between our elicitation procedure and that of Andersen et al. (2008). We find
very similar results with both methods, though this similarity depends on the parametric assumptions of
the utility function required for joint estimation. Given that the two different methods elicit preferences
in two different dimensions (probabilities versus monetary amounts), we are encouraged by these results.
We observe low discount rates among a population hither-to-now thought to be (at least by the authors)
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excessively impatient. Given prevailing interest rates at the time the study was conducted, perhaps we
should not be so surprised to find one-third of our participants were willing to save with us for the duration
of the semester when offered as little as 1.02 percent.
We conduct a second experiment to explore the robustness of our findings to a reduction in front-end delay
and time horizon of payment. We find that when the sooner payment takes place at the conclusion of the
experimental session during which decisions are made (zero FED), estimated discount rates are significantly
higher than in our baseline treatment with a two-week FED. However, even with no FED, 22 percent of
subjects are willing to wait to receive payment at an AEIR of just 1.01 percent. Increasing the FED to one
day also leads to a significant increase in the estimated discount rate relative to the baseline FED of two
weeks. Both of these results indicate significant present-bias in our data. In contrast, changing the time
horizon between payment dates from one week to seven weeks has no significant effect on the estimated
discount rate.
A potential advantage of a single elicitation procedure, as compared with a dual elicitation procedure, is
ease of implementation, which is a non-trivial consideration in field settings. In addition, the discount rate
estimate from the P Task is independent of any errors in estimating the curvature of the utility function
(as long as preferences are linear in probabilities).The same logic that shows the importance of correcting
for the curvature of the utility function also shows that an error in estimating curvature will be propagated
to the discount rate estimate. Overestimate the curvature and the discount rate will be biased downward.
Underestimate, and the discount rate will be biased upward. Another vexing issue with estimating the
curvature of the utility function is the need to estimate other parameters such as the level of background
consumption. As long as background consumption is invariant over the time frame of the elicitation, we can
safely avoid the need to estimate this parameter by use of the probability discounting procedure.
Moving forward with this research, more work needs to be done to consider non-expected utility frame-
works. Our method does assume that preferences are linear in probabilities. Because of this, we test for
evidence of probability weighting in our data. We do not find support for such weighting, given our subject
pool and parameter values. In other populations and for other parameter values this may not be the case.
We show in Section 2 that judicious choice of the parameter values may enable an experimenter with a good
a priori sense of the form of probability weighting in her population to minimize it’s impact. The alternative
would be to administer multiple probability discounting tasks and then estimate both the probability weight-
ing function as well as the discount rate. Note that there is still an advantage to using probability discounting
tasks rather than monetary discounting tasks, in that at least we can avoid specifying and estimating the
value function.
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A Instructions and Decision Sheets
Introductory Instructions
You are now participating in a decision-making experiment. Based on your decisions in this experiment, you
can earn money that will be paid to you in cash. It is important that you understand all instructions before
making your choices in this experiment.
Please turn off your cell phone, laptop computer, or any other device you may have brought with you.
Please do not talk with others seated in the room for the duration of the experiment. If at any point you
have a question, please raise your hand and we will address it as soon as possible.
The experiment consists of three decision-making tasks. You have earned $5 for arriving for the exper-
iment on time, and you will be paid another $5 for each of the three tasks that you complete. So, if you
complete all three decision-making tasks you will earn $20 for participating in today’s experiment.
In addition to your participation payment, you may earn considerably more from each task. Each of the
decision tasks and the potential earnings from these tasks will be explained in detail as we proceed through
the instructions. Your earnings from each of the three tasks will be calculated at the end of todays session
after all three tasks are completed.
However, it is important that you know that you will not receive any earnings, other than your partici-
pation payments, unless you complete all three decision-making tasks. For example, if you leave right now
you will be paid $5 for coming to todays experiment. On the other hand if you leave after completing two
of the three tasks today, you will receive $15 but you will not be eligible to receive any other payments from
todays experiment. If you complete all three tasks, you will receive your $20 participation payment and be
eligible to receive additional earnings based on your decisions in the three tasks.
Are there any questions so far?
Task D Instructions
Each person in this room has the chance to earn a large sum of money from this part of the experiment.
The amount of money you earn in this part of the experiment will depend both on your choices and also on
chance. We will first explain to you the choices that you will be making, and then how your earnings are
determined.
YOUR CHOICES
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices between Option A and Option
B.
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Please look at the Decision Table. Each Decision row gives you a choice between Option A and Option
B. As an example, look at the row for Decision 4. Your choice here is between Option A, which pays $200
in three weeks, and Option B, which pays $201.39 in 12 weeks.
Looking down the rows of the Decision Table you can see that you have 20 Decisions to make. In each
of these Decisions, Option A represents a chance to earn $200 in three weeks. With Option B, the amount
of money paid in 12 weeks starts at $200 in Decision 1, and increases as you move down the rows in the
Decision Table. For example, in Decision 13 Option A pays $200 in 3 weeks and Option B pays $207.92 in
12 weeks.
In the Decision Table there are two columns labeled “Annual Interest Rate” and “Annual Effective
Interest Rate”. To explain these terms, let us once again consider Decision 13:
Option A pays $200.00 three weeks from today. Option B pays $207.92 12 weeks from today. In this
example, if you choose option B you will earn an annual interest rate of 22.50% on the $200 you will receive
12 weeks from today. The interest accrues starting 3 weeks from today, and is compounded daily, resulting in
an annual effective interest rate of 25.22%. The annual effective interest rate is the rate earned on the initial
balance ($200 in this example) plus interest earned on all interest accumulated in the preceding compounding
periods (daily, starting 3 weeks from now until 12 weeks from now).
You will make twenty choices. For each Decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and
Option B. You may choose A for some Decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your choice
and make them in any order. So now please look at the boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will
have to circle your choice of A or B for each of the twenty Decisions.
Even though you will make twenty Decisions, only one of these will end up possibly affecting your
earnings, but you will not know in advance which Decision will be used. Each Decision has an equal chance
of being used for payment.
HOW YOU WILL YOU BE PAID
For each Decision row, choose whether you prefer A or B for that row. After you have made all 20
Decisions, we will throw a black 20-sided die. You can see this die on the lab monitors. The number that
is thrown on the 20-sided die will determine which one of your 20 Decisions will count for payment. For
example, if we throw a 12, we will look at Decision Row 12 to see if you chose Option A or Option B. We will
not look at any of your other Decisions when we determine your earnings for this part of the experiment.
After this, we will throw a Black 10-sided die for the final payment phase. If the outcome is between 1
and 9, then none of your choices in this part of the experiment will count for payment. If the outcome is a
0, then your choice in the Decision chosen for payment will determine your earnings as described above.
Note that we will roll the dice individually for each person, and so each person is equally likely to receive
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payment in the final payment phase of the experiment. More than one person may be selected for payment,
and each person selected will be paid the amount determined by their choices and die rolls as described
above.
If you earn money in this task, we will give you a certificate for the payment you earn, redeemable in cash
here in the Andrew Young School Building in three weeks or 12 weeks, depending on the option you choose.
If you do earn this money, then at the end of the experiment we will give you more detailed instructions for
redeeming your certificate and the location in this building where you will go to redeem your certificate.
SUMMARY
1. You will choose Option A or Option B for each of the 20 rows of the Decision Table.
2. We will throw a Black 20-sided die to determine which ONE of these Decisions will count. We will
look at your choice in this Decision only.
3. Finally, we will throw a 10-sided die to determine whether or not this outcome will be paid. If we
throw a 1-9 then you will not be paid for your Decision. If we throw a 0, then you will receive payment
according to whether you choose Option A or Option B. If the outcome is for you to receive money,
then you will receive a certificate for payment that may be redeemed in three- or 12-weeks (depending
on whether you chose Option A or Option B).
We will next go through a simple demonstration of this task before you make your choices. This demon-
stration is to help you better understand the task and will not count for money. Please listen and watch the
demonstration before making your own choices.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
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Task D Decision Sheet (originally printed on legal paper)
Task D Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(receive amount below in  
three weeks) 
Option B 
(receive amount below in  
twelve weeks) 
Annual 
Interest 
Rate 
Annual 
Effective 
Interest Rate 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
1 $200 $200 0% 0% A B 
2 $200 $200.35 1% 1.01% A B 
3 $200 $200.69 2% 2.02% A B 
4 $200 $201.39 4% 4.08% A B 
5 $200 $202.08 6% 6.18% A B 
6 $200 $202.78 8% 8.33% A B 
7 $200 $203.48 10% 10.52% A B 
8 $200 $204.18 12% 12.75% A B 
9 $200 $204.89 14% 15.02% A B 
10 $200 $205.60 16% 17.35% A B 
11 $200 $206.31 18% 19.72% A B 
12 $200 $207.02 20% 22.13% A B 
13 $200 $207.92 22.5% 25.22% A B 
14 $200 $208.82 25% 28.39% A B 
15 $200 $210.62 30% 34.97% A B 
16 $200 $214.29 40% 49.15% A B 
17 $200 $218.01 50% 64.82% A B 
18 $200 $227.61 75% 111.54% A B 
19 $200 $237.62 100% 171.46% A B 
20 $200 $258.96 150% 346.79% A B 
 
  
ID Num 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
 Selection for 
Payment Roll 
 
       
   Black-20  Black-10 
(0 = pay) 
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Task P Instructions
Each person in this room has the chance to earn a large sum of money from this part of the experiment.
The amount of money you earn in this part of the experiment will depend both on your choices and also on
chance. We will first explain to you the choices that you will be making, and then how your earnings are
determined.
YOUR CHOICES
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices between Option A and Option
B. On the lab monitors, you can see three 10-sided die: a red die, a white die, and a blue die.
Your earnings in this part of the experiment depend, in part, on the outcome from rolling these three
die. We will throw the dice, and then record the outcomes as a three digit number:
RedDie# WhiteDie# BlueDie#
For example, if we threw a “6” on the Red Die, a “4” on the White Die, and a “0” on the Blue Die, the
number recorded would be 640. On the other hand, if we threw a “0” on the Red Die, “6” on the White Die
and a “4” on the Blue Die, the number recorded would be 064. Notice that there are one thousand possible
outcomes of the drawing. They can be listed as:
{001, 002, 003, 004, . . . , 996, 997, 998, 999, 000}
Each of these numbers has a 1-in-1000 chance of being thrown (if three zeros are thrown, this will represent
an outcome of 1000).
Please look at the Decision Table. Each Decision row gives you a choice between Option A and Option
B. As an example, look at the row for Decision 2. Option A pays $200 in three weeks if the number thrown
on the die is between 001 to 500. Thus, there are 500-in-1000 chances of receiving $200 if you choose Option
A. This represents a 50% chance of winning. Now look at Option B for Decision 2. Option B pays $200 in
12 weeks if the number thrown on the die is between 001 to 501. There are 501-in-1000 chances (50.1%)
that the number drawn will be in this range. As you move down the table, Option A is always the same,
but with Option B the chances of winning increase.
Looking down the rows of the Decision Table you can see that you have 20 Decisions to make. In each of
these Decisions, Option A represents a chance to earn $200 in three weeks if the number thrown on the die
is between 001 and 500. In each of these Decisions, Option B represents a chance to earn $200 in 12 weeks,
with the chance of earning this money increasing as you move down the rows of the table. For example,
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in Decision 16, there is a 500-in-1000 chance of earning $200 in 3 weeks if you choose Option A and a
536-in-1000 chance of earning $200 in 12 weeks if you choose Option B.
You will make twenty choices. For each Decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and
Option B. You may choose A for some Decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your choice
and make them in any order. So now please look at the boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will
have to circle your choice of A or B for each of the twenty Decisions.
Even though you will make twenty Decisions, only one of these will end up possibly affecting your
earnings, but you will not know in advance which Decision will be used. Each Decision has an equal chance
of being used for payment.
HOW YOU WILL YOU BE PAID
For each Decision row, choose whether you prefer A or B for that row. After you have made all 20
Decisions, we will throw a black 20-sided die. You can see this die on the lab monitors. The number that
is thrown on the 20-sided die will determine which one of your 20 Decisions will count for payment. For
example, if we throw a 12, we will look at Decision Row 12 to see if you chose Option A or Option B. We will
not look at any of your other Decisions when we determine your earnings for this part of the experiment.
Next, we will throw the three colored 10-sided dice to determine whether the monetary outcome is $200,
as we described above. Continuing with the example for Decision 12, the table below illustrates the outcomes
that would occur depending on the 3-digit die throw and whether you chose Option A or Option B.
Outcome If You Outcome If You
Die Throw Choose Option A Choose Option B
001 - 500 $200 in 3 weeks $200 in 12 weeks
501 - 518 $0 $200 in 12 weeks
519 - 000 $0 $0
Suppose instead that when we threw the 20-sided die we had determined that Decision 3 was the one
that counts for payment. In this case, the table below illustrates the outcomes that would occur depending
on the 3-digit die throw and whether you chose Option A or Option B.
Outcome If You Outcome If You
Die Throw Choose Option A Choose Option B
001 - 500 $200 in 3 weeks $200 in 12 weeks
501 - 502 $0 $200 in 12 weeks
503 - 000 $0 $0
After this, we will throw a Black 10-sided die for the final payment phase. If the outcome is between 2
and 9, then none of your choices in this part of the experiment will count for payment. If the outcome is a
0 or 1, then your choices and the earlier rolls will determine your earnings as described above.
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Note that we will roll the dice individually for each person, and so each person is equally likely to receive
payment in the final payment phase of the experiment. More than one person may be selected for payment,
and each person selected will be paid the amount determined by their choices and die rolls as described
above.
If you earn $200 in this task, we will give you a certificate for $200 redeemable in cash here in the Andrew
Young School Building in three weeks or 12 weeks, depending on the option you choose. If you do earn this
money, then at the end of the experiment we will give you more detailed instructions for redeeming your
certificate and the location in this building where you will go to redeem your certificate.
SUMMARY
1. You will choose Option A or Option B for each of the 20 rows of the Decision Table.
2. We will throw a Black 20-sided die to determine which ONE of these Decisions will count.
3. We will look at the choice you made in this Decision, and then throw the three 10-sided dice (one red,
one blue, and one white).
4. We will look at the three-digit-number that comes from the dice roll and also at your choice for this
one Decision to determine the monetary outcome: receive $0, receive $200 in three weeks, or receive
$200 in 12 weeks.
5. Finally, we will throw a 10-sided die to determine whether or not this outcome will be paid. If we
throw a 2-9 then you will not be paid for your Decision. If we throw a 0 or 1, then you will receive
payment according to the outcome in step #4. If the outcome is for you to receive $200, then you will
receive a certificate for $200 that may be redeemed in three- or 12-weeks (depending on whether you
chose Option A or Option B).
We will next go through a simple demonstration of this task before you make your choices. This demon-
stration is to help you better understand the task and will not count for money. Please listen and watch the
demonstration before making your own choices.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
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Task P Decision Sheet (originally printed on legal paper)
Task P Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(Pays $200 in three weeks) 
Option B 
(Pays $200 in twelve weeks) 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
 
Winning Numbers for Option A 
Chances of 
winning Winning Numbers for Option B 
Chances of 
winning 
  
1 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0. 
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the 
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0. 
50.0% A B 
2 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 1.  
50.1% A B 
3 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 2. 
50.2% A B 
4 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 4.  
50.4% A B 
5 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 5.  
50.5% A B 
6 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 7.  
50.7% A B 
7 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 9.  
50.9% A B 
8 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 1 1.  
51.1% A B 
9 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0. 
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 1 2. 
51.2% A B 
10 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 1 4.  
51.4% A B 
11 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 1 6.  
51.6% A B 
12 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 1 8.  
51.8% A B 
13 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 2 0.  
52.0% A B 
14 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 2 2.  
52.2% A B 
15 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 2 7.  
52.7% A B 
16 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 3 6.  
53.6% A B 
17 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 4 5.  
54.5% A B 
18 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0. 
50.0% You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 6 9. 
56.9% A B 
19 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0. 
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 9 4. 
59.4% A B 
20 
You receive $200 in three weeks if the 
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 5 0 0.  
50.0% 
You receive $200 in twelve weeks if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 1 and 6 4 7.  
64.7% A B 
 
  
ID Num 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
  
Outcome Roll 
 Selection for 
Payment Roll 
 
             
   Black-20  Red-10  White-10  Blue-10  Black-10 
(0 or 1 = pay) 
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Task R Instructions
Each person in this room has the chance to earn a large sum of money from this part of the experiment.
The amount of money you earn in this part of the experiment will depend both on your choices and also on
chance. We will first explain to you the choices that you will be making, and then how your earnings are
determined.
YOUR CHOICES
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices. Please look at the Decision
Table. Each Decision row gives you a choice between Option A and Option B. Now, please look at Decision
1 at the top. Option A pays $180.00 if the throw of the Red 20-sided die is 1, and it pays $144.00 if the
throw is 2 through 20. Option B pays $346.50 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $9.00 if the throw is
2 through 20. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 20 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed
since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $180.00 or $346.50.
You will make twenty choices. For each Decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and
Option B. You may choose A for some Decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your choice
and make them in any order. So now please look at the boxes on the right side of the Decision Table. You
will have to circle your choice of A or B for each of the twenty Decisions.
Even though you will make twenty Decisions, only one of these will end up possibly affecting your
earnings, but you will not know in advance which Decision will be used. Each Decision has an equal chance
of being used for payment.
HOW YOU WILL YOU BE PAID
Although you will complete all 20 Decisions, only one of these Decisions will be selected as the Decision
that counts for payment. After you have made all 20 Decisions, we will throw a Black 20-sided die. You can
see this die on the lab monitors. The number that is thrown on this 20-sided die will determine which one of
your 20 Decisions will count for payment. For example, if we throw a 12, we will look at Decision Row 12 to
see if you chose Option A or Option B. We will not look at any of your other Decisions when we determine
your earnings for this part of the experiment.
Next, we will throw the Red 20-sided die to determine the monetary outcome from this task, as we
described above.
After this, we will throw a black 10-sided die for the final payment phase. If the outcome is between 1
and 9, then none of your choices in this task will count for payment. If the outcome is 0, then your choices
and the earlier rolls will determine your earnings as described above.
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Note that we will roll the dice individually for each person, and so each person is equally likely to receive
payment in the final payment phase of the experiment. More than one person may be selected for payment,
and each person selected will be paid the amount determined by their choices and die rolls as described
above.
If you earn money in this task, we will pay you your earnings in cash before you leave today.
SUMMARY
1. You will choose Option A or Option B for each of the 20 rows of the Decision Table.
2. We will throw a black 20-sided die to determine which ONE of these Decisions will count.
3. We will look at the choice you made in this Decision, and then throw a red 20-sided die.
4. We will determine the monetary outcome based on the outcome of the red die and your choice for the
selected Decision.
5. Finally, we will throw a black 10-sided die to determine whether or not you will be paid this outcome.
If we throw a 1 through 9 then you will not be paid for your Decision. If we throw a 0, then you
will receive payment according to the outcome in step #4. If you are paid, then you will receive your
money before you leave today.
We will next go through a simple demonstration of this task before you make your choices. This demon-
stration is to help you better understand the task and will not count for money. Please listen and watch the
demonstration before making your own choices.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
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Task R Decision Sheet (originally printed on legal paper)
Task R Decision Table 
 
Decision Option A 
 
Option B 
 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
1 
$180 if throw of die is 1 
$144 if throw of die is 2-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1 
$9 if throw of die is 2-20 
A B 
2 
$180 if throw of die is 1-2 
$144 if throw of die is 3-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-2 
$9 if throw of die is 3-20 
A B 
3 
$180 if throw of die is 1-3 
$144 if throw of die is 4-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-3 
$9 if throw of die is 4-20 
A B 
4 
$180 if throw of die is 1-4 
$144 if throw of die is 5-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-4 
$9 if throw of die is 5-20 
A B 
5 
$180 if throw of die is 1-5 
$144 if throw of die is 6-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-5 
$9 if throw of die is 6-20 
A B 
6 
$180 if throw of die is 1-6 
$144 if throw of die is 7-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-6 
$9 if throw of die is 7-20 
A B 
7 
$180 if throw of die is 1-7 
$144 if throw of die is 8-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-7 
$9 if throw of die is 8-20 
A B 
8 
$180 if throw of die is 1-8 
$144 if throw of die is 9-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-8 
$9 if throw of die is 9-20 
A B 
9 
$180 if throw of die is 1-9 
$144 if throw of die is 10-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-9 
$9 if throw of die is 10-20 
A B 
10 
$180 if throw of die is 1-10 
$144 if throw of die is 11-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-10 
$9 if throw of die is 11-20 
A B 
11 
$180 if throw of die is 1-11 
$144 if throw of die is 12-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-11 
$9 if throw of die is 12-20 
A B 
12 
$180 if throw of die is 1-12 
$144 if throw of die is 13-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-12 
$9 if throw of die is 13-20 
A B 
13 
$180 if throw of die is 1-13 
$144 if throw of die is 14-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-13 
$9 if throw of die is 14-20 
A B 
14 
$180 if throw of die is 1-14 
$144 if throw of die is 15-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-14 
$9 if throw of die is 15-20 
A B 
15 
$180 if throw of die is 1-15 
$144 if throw of die is 16-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-15 
$9 if throw of die is 16-20 
A B 
16 
$180 if throw of die is 1-16 
$144 if throw of die is 17-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-16 
$9 if throw of die is 17-20 
A B 
17 
$180 if throw of die is 1-17 
$144 if throw of die is 18-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-17 
$9 if throw of die is 18-20 
A B 
18 
$180 if throw of die is 1-18 
$144 if throw of die is 19-20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-18 
$9 if throw of die is 19-20 
A B 
19 
$180 if throw of die is 1-19 
$144 if throw of die is 20 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-19 
$9 if throw of die is 20 
A B 
20 $180 if throw of die is 1-20 
 
$346.50 if throw of die is 1-20 
 
A B 
 
  
ID Num 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
 Outcome 
Roll 
 Selection for 
Payment Roll 
 
         
   Black-20  Red-20  Black-10 
(0 = pay) 
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Experiment 2 Introductory Instructions
You are now participating in a decision-making experiment. Based on your decisions in this experiment, you
can earn money that will be paid to you in cash. It is important that you understand all instructions before
making your choices in this experiment.
Please turn off your cell phone, laptop computer, or any other device you may have brought with you.
Please do not talk with others seated in the room for the duration of the experiment. If at any point you
have a question, please raise your hand and we will address it as soon as possible. Also, please remove
everything from your desk except for your folder, these instructions, and something to write with.
The experiment consists of four decision-making tasks. You have earned $5 for arriving for the experiment
on time, and you will be paid another $5 for each of the four tasks that you complete. So, if you complete
all four decision-making tasks you will earn $25 for participating in today’s experiment.
In addition to your participation payment, you may earn considerably more from each task. Each of the
decision tasks and the potential earnings from these tasks will be explained in detail as we proceed through
the instructions. Your earnings from each of the four tasks will be calculated at the end of todays session
after all four tasks are completed.
However, it is important that you know that you will not receive any earnings, other than your partic-
ipation payments, unless you complete all four decision-making tasks. For example, if you leave right now
you will be paid $5 for coming to todays experiment. On the other hand if you leave after completing two
of the four tasks today, you will receive $15 but you will not be eligible to receive any other payments from
todays experiment. If you complete all four tasks, you will receive your $25 participation payment and be
eligible to receive additional earnings based on your decisions in the four tasks.
Are there any questions so far?
Experiment 2 Main Instructions
In today’s experiment you will participate in four Decision-Making Tasks. Each Task involves the chance to
earn $100 that may be paid to you today, or on a specified date later in the semester. Whether you earn
this $100 (in addition to your participation payment) and when you receive the $100 will depend on both
your choices in these Tasks and also on chance.
Even though you will participate in four Decision-Making Tasks, only one of these four tasks will count
for payment. After you have completed all Tasks in today’s experiment, we will randomly choose one of
them that will be used to determine any additional earnings. To choose the Task for payment, we will throw
a 6-sided die for each person individually:
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· If we throw a 1 Task 1 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 2 Task 2 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 3 Task 3 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 4 Task 4 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 5 or 6 we will throw again until a 1 through 4 comes up.
So, if I throw a 3 for one person, that persons additional earnings will be based upon Task 3 only. If I
throw a 4 for another person, that person will be will be paid based upon Task 4 only.
We will first explain to you the choices that you will be making, and then how your earnings will
determined.
YOUR CHOICES
In each part of this experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices between Option A and
Option B. On the lab monitors, you can see four 10-sided die: a red die, a white die, a blue die, and a black
die.
Your earnings in this part of the experiment depend, in part, on the outcome from rolling these four die.
We will throw all four dice, and then record the outcome as a four digit number:
RedDie# WhiteDie# BlueDie# BlackDie#
For example, if we threw a “6” on the Red Die, a “4” on the White Die, a “0” on the Blue Die, and a
“2” on the Black Die, the number recorded would be 6402. On the other hand, if we threw a “0” on the Red
Die, “6” on the White Die, a “4” on the Blue Die, and a “2” on the Black Die, the number recorded would
be 0642. Notice that there are ten thousand possible outcomes of the drawing. They can be listed as:
{0001, 0002, 0003, 0004, . . . , 9996, 9997, 9998, 9999, 0000}
Each of these numbers has a 1-in-10,000 chance of being thrown (if four zeros are thrown, this will represent
an outcome of 10,000).
Please look at the Sample Decision Table. This sample table is being used to demonstrate the types of
decisions you will be making and how the payments will be determined. The payment dates and the die
rolls listed are different than those you will actually see during the experiment.
In this sample table, each Decision row gives you a choice between Option A and Option B. As an
example, look at the row for Decision 2. Option A pays $100 in 7 days (one week) if the number thrown
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is between 0001 to 5000. Thus, there are 5,000-in-10,000 chances of receiving $100 if you choose Option A.
This represents a 50% chance of winning. Now look at Option B for Decision 2. Option B pays $100 in 35
days (5 weeks) if the number thrown is between 0001 to 5004. There are 5,004-in-10,000 chances (50.4%)
that the number drawn will be in this range. As you move down the table, Option A is always the same,
but with Option B the chances of winning increase.
Looking down the rows of the Sample Decision Table, you can see that you have 14 Decisions to make. In
each of these Decisions, Option A represents a chance to earn $100 in 7 days if the number thrown on the die
is between 0001 and 5000. In each of these Decisions, Option B represents a chance to earn $100 in 35 days,
with the chance of earning this money increasing as you move down the rows of the table. For example, in
Decision 12, there is a 5,000-in-10,000 (50 percent) chance of earning $100 in 7 days if you choose Option A
and a 5,116-in-10,000 (51.16 percent) chance of earning $100 in 35 days if you choose Option B.
In each of the four Decision-Making Tasks, you will make 14 choices that are similar to those in this
example. Each involves a choice between a chance to receive $100 on two different dates. The dates on which
you would be paid, and the chance of receiving the $100, will be different in each of the four Tasks (and all
four are different than those on the Sample Decision Sheet).
For each Decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for
some Decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your choices and make them in any order.
So now please look at the boxes on the right side of the Sample Decision Sheet. If this were an actual Task,
you would circle your choice of A or B for each of the 14 Decisions.
Even though you will make 14 Decisions in each Task, only one of these 14 Decisions will end up affecting
your earnings (for the one Task chosen for payment), but you will not know in advance which Decision will
be used. Each Decision has an equal chance of being used for payment.
HOW YOU WILL YOU BE PAID
For each Decision row, you will choose whether you prefer A or B for that row. For the Decision-Making
Task that is chosen for payment, we will throw a 20-sided die. You can see this die on the lab monitors.
The number that is thrown on the 20-sided die will determine which one of your 14 Decisions will count
for payment (if I throw 15-20, I will throw the die again). For example, if we throw a 12, we will look at
Decision Row 12 to see if you chose Option A or Option B. We will not look at any of your other Decisions
when we determine your earnings.
Next, we will throw the four colored 10-sided dice to determine whether the monetary outcome is $100,
as we described above. Continuing with the example, for Decision 12 in the Sample Decision Table, the table
below illustrates the outcomes that would occur depending on the 4-digit die throw and whether you chose
Option A or Option B in the Sample Decision Sheet.
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Outcome If You Outcome If You
Die Throw Choose Option A Choose Option B
0001 - 5000 $100 in 7 days $100 in 35 days
5001 - 5116 $0 $100 in 35 days
5117 - 0000 $0 $0
Suppose instead that when we threw the 20-sided die, we had determined that Decision 3 was the one
that counts for payment. In this case, the table below illustrates the outcomes that would occur depending
on the 4-digit die throw and whether you chose Option A or Option B.
Outcome If You Outcome If You
Die Throw Choose Option A Choose Option B
0001 - 5000 $100 in 7 days $100 in 35 days
5001 - 5008 $0 $100 in 35 days
5009 - 0000 $0 $0
Recall that each person will see a different die roll - so some of you may earn $100 and others will earn
nothing. It depends on the die rolls and on your choice of Option A or Option B.
If the outcome results in you earning $100 on a later date, I will give you a certificate for $100 redeemable
in cash here in the Andrew Young School Building on the date specified in the Decision selected to be paid.
You can pick up your $100 earnings at any time on or after that date. If you do earn this money, then
at the end of the experiment we will give you more detailed instructions for redeeming your certificate and
the location in this building where you will go to redeem your certificate. Regardless of whether or not you
earn this $100, you will still receive the $25 participation payment if you complete all four Decision-Making
Tasks.
SUMMARY
1. We will hand out four separate Decision Tables to you, one at a time. For each Decision Table you
should pay careful attention to all of the information you are given. The time at which you may receive
payment, and the chance of winning, will be different for each Decision task and all will be different
from the Sample Decision Sheet we have used in the instructions.
2. For each Decision Task, you will make a choice of Option A or Option B for each of the 14 rows of the
Decision Table. You can choose A for some rows and B for other rows.
3. After all four tasks are complete, we will give you a short survey to fill out.
4. We will call you outside of the lab one at a time to determine your earnings individually and privately.
5. We will throw a 6-sided die to determine which ONE of the four Decision-Making Tasks will count for
payment:
49
· If we throw a 1 – Task 1 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 2 – Task 2 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 3 – Task 3 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 4 – Task 4 will count for payment.
· If we throw a 5 or 6 – we will throw again until a 1 through 4 comes up.
6. For the ONE decision-making task that is selected in Step 5, we will throw a 20-sided die to determine
which ONE of your 14 Decisions will count. (If we throw a number between 15 and 20 we will throw
the die again until a number between 1 and 14 comes up.)
7. We will look at the choice you made in this Decision, and then throw the four 10-sided dice.
8. We will look at the four-digit-number that comes from the dice roll and also at your choice for this one
Decision to determine the monetary outcome: receive $0, or receive $100 - and when you will receive
$100.
9. You will be paid for your participation today. If the outcome is to receive $100 in the future, we will
give you a certificate for this and instructions on where to come back and receive your earnings.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
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Experiment 2 Task A Decision Sheet (Baseline)
Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(Pays $100 in 14 days) 
Option B 
(Pays $100 in 63 days) 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
 
Winning Numbers for Option A 
Chances of 
winning Winning Numbers for Option B 
Chances of 
winning 
  
1 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the # 
rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% A B 
2 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 7.  
50.07% A B 
3 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 3. 
50.13% A B 
4 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 2 7.  
50.27% A B 
5 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 4 0.  
50.40% A B 
6 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 5 4.  
50.54% A B 
7 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 6 8.  
50.68% A B 
8 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 8 1.  
50.81% A B 
9 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 0 9. 
51.09% A B 
10 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 3 6.  
51.36% A B 
11 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 7 1.  
51.71% A B 
12 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 0 5.  
52.05% A B 
13 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 7 6.  
52.76% A B 
14 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 63 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 5 2 9.  
55.29% A B 
 
 Task 
Number 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
  
                      Outcome Roll 
   
             
   Black-20  Red-10  White-10  Blue-10  Black-10  
A 
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Experiment 2 Task B Decision Sheet (No FED)
Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(Pays $100 today) 
Option B 
(Pays $100 in 49 days) 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
 
Winning Numbers for Option A 
Chances of 
winning Winning Numbers for Option B 
Chances of 
winning 
  
1 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the # 
rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% A B 
2 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 7.  
50.07% A B 
3 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 3. 
50.13% A B 
4 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 2 7.  
50.27% A B 
5 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 4 0.  
50.40% A B 
6 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 5 4.  
50.54% A B 
7 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 6 8.  
50.68% A B 
8 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 8 1.  
50.81% A B 
9 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 0 9. 
51.09% A B 
10 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 3 6.  
51.36% A B 
11 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 7 1.  
51.71% A B 
12 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 0 5.  
52.05% A B 
13 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 7 6.  
52.76% A B 
14 
You receive $100 today if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 49 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 5 2 9.  
55.29% A B 
 
 Task 
Number 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
  
                      Outcome Roll 
   
             
   Black-20  Red-10  White-10  Blue-10  Black-10  
B 
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Experiment 2 Task C Decision Sheet (Short FED)
Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(Pays $100 in 1 day) 
Option B 
(Pays $100 in 50 days) 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
 
Winning Numbers for Option A 
Chances of 
winning Winning Numbers for Option B 
Chances of 
winning 
  
1 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the # 
rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% A B 
2 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 7.  
50.07% A B 
3 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 3. 
50.13% A B 
4 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 2 7.  
50.27% A B 
5 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 4 0.  
50.40% A B 
6 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 5 4.  
50.54% A B 
7 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 6 8.  
50.68% A B 
8 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 8 1.  
50.81% A B 
9 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 0 9. 
51.09% A B 
10 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 3 6.  
51.36% A B 
11 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 1 7 1.  
51.71% A B 
12 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 0 5.  
52.05% A B 
13 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 2 7 6.  
52.76% A B 
14 
You receive $100 in 1 day if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 50 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 5 2 9.  
55.29% A B 
 
 Task 
Number 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
  
                      Outcome Roll 
   
             
   Black-20  Red-10  White-10  Blue-10  Black-10  
C 
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Experiment 2 Task D Decision Sheet (Short Horizon)
Decision Table 
 
Decision 
Option A 
(Pays $100 in 14 days) 
Option B 
(Pays $100 in 21 days) 
Preferred 
Option 
(Circle  
A or B) 
 
Winning Numbers for Option A 
Chances of 
winning Winning Numbers for Option B 
Chances of 
winning 
  
1 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the # 
rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% A B 
2 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 1.  
50.01% A B 
3 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 2. 
50.02% A B 
4 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 4.  
50.04% A B 
5 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 6.  
50.06% A B 
6 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 8.  
50.08% A B 
7 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 0.  
50.10% A B 
8 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 2.  
50.12% A B 
9 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0. 
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 5. 
50.15% A B 
10 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 1 9.  
50.19% A B 
11 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% 
You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 2 4.  
50.24% A B 
12 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 2 9.  
50.29% A B 
13 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 3 8.  
50.38% A B 
14 
You receive $100 in 14 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 0 0.  
50.00% You receive $100 in 21 days if the  
# rolled is between 0 0 0 1 and 5 0 7 2.  
50.72% A B 
 
 Task 
Number 
 Decision 
Row Roll 
  
                      Outcome Roll 
   
             
   Black-20  Red-10  White-10  Blue-10  Black-10  
D 
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